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This thesis examines the hypothesis that American strategic
nuclear doctrine since 1965 has been significantly influenced
by multiple domestic variables. This analysis begins with an
examination of the changes in American strategic doctrine, as
expressed in the Secretary of Defense's annual statement,
between 1965-1980. The relationships which precipitated these
changes are explored in terms of the following domestic variables:
(1) American perceptions of the Soviet threat
(2) Strategic weapons system development
(3) American public opinion
(4) The personalities of key American policy-makers
(5) The Vietnam War
Because of the complex inter-relationship between these
variables, the modification of strategic doctrine can be
accomplished only incrementally and thus rapid doctrinal
change is virtually beyond the control of "grand strategists."
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I. AIMS, METHODS, AND CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
In June 1977, in a speech regarding national security and
the international environment, the Director of the State
Department's Bpreau of Politico-Military Affairs, Leslie
Gelb, reflected on the Carter Administration's approach to
international relations and doctrines:
The general approach of this Administration
in the first four months was not to try to
mass this diparate, diverse, and sometimes
incomprehensible foreign policy universe into
a new strategy. There is no Carter Doctrine,
or Vance Doctrine, or Brown Doctrine, because
of a belief that the environment we are look-
ing at is far too complex to be reduced to a
doctrine in the tradition of post-World War
II American foreign policy. Indeed, the
Carter approach to foreign policy rests on
the belief that not only is the world far
too complex to be reduced to a doctrine, but
that there is something inherently wrong with
having a doctrine at all.-'-
In little more than three years, however, events would alter
this determination to conduct foreign policy without the con-
straints of a "doctrine." In his statement to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee regarding American nuclear stra-
tegy Secretary of State Edmund Muskie asserted:
...I am particularly concerned with the ways
in which our strategic doctrine bears on our
overall foreign policy...

. . .the countervailing strategy is not a radical
departure from previous policy. It is rather
the result of a gradual evolution of our doc-
trine over a period of years in a response to
changing conditions and new knowledge.
Similarly, "changing conditions and new knowledge" have also
focused the attention of an increasing number of Americans
on questions of doctrine for foreign policy in general and
for strategic nuclear weapons in particular. In February
1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
Iranian seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Gallup
Opinion Index indicated that "international problems" was the
"most important problem" to the majority of those surveyed.
This marked the first time since 1973 that an international
3
response had out-polled a domestic one. The 1980 Presidential
campaign focused heavily on questions related to foreign pol-
icy and defense. In short, Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59),
referenced in Secretary Muskie's policy statements above is
but a single indicator of an increased public concern regard-
ing the adequacy and basic determinants of American strategic
nuclear doctrine.
Two fundamental questions follow which this thesis will
attempt to address them. First, what are the determinants of
American strategic nuclear doctrine? Secondly, can these
determinants be manipulated by policy-makers to alter stra-
tegic doctrine?
The determinants of strategic doctrine, to paraphrase
Samuel Huntington, have a "Janus-like quality." Like military

policy, strategic doctrine "...exists in two worlds. One is
international politics, the world of the balance of power,
wars and alliances ... [t]he other world is domestic politics,
the world of interest groups, political parties, [and] social
4
classes..." Of these two major categories of determinants,
however, this thesis focuses on the domestic determinants.
The international determinants, such as alliance politics,
foreign domestic politics, and the strategic programs of one's
principal adversary, are generally beyond the direct influence
of a nation's principal policy-makers. Domestic determinants,
on the other hand, can theoretically be more directly manipu-
lated by a "grand strategist" in pursuit of a satisfactory
strategic doctrine. This thesis will attempt to determine to
what degree such manipulation is possible.
This thesis will examine the domestic determinants of
American strategic nuclear doctrine to test the following
hypothesis
:
American strategic nuclear doctrine since 1965 has been
significantly influenced by multiple domestic variables.
Because of these variables and their complex inter-relation-
ships, the deliberate modification of strategic doctrine is
extremely difficult and can be accomplished only incrementally
Thus, rapid doctrinal change is beyond the control of "grand
strategists ."

B. THE VARIABLES AND THE STRUCTURE
The following five domestic variables were selected as
most worthy of thorough description and analysis:
(1) American perceptions of the Soviet threat.
(2) Strategic weapons system development and the concept
of technological determinism.
(3) The effects of the Vietnam War.
(4) Domestic public opinion.
(5) The effects of the key policy-makers.
Detailed justifications for selection of each variable are
provided in the body of the thesis. The principal a priori
reasons for their initial selection follow.
While intertwined with the international dimensions of
doctrinal development, American perceptions of the Soviet
threat and the domestic causes of these perceptions are cru-
cial to an understanding of the other domestic variables.
Since 1945, American perceptions of relative Soviet aggressive-
ness have been among the key elements of defense planning.
The effects of weapon system development on strategic doe-
trine was chosen because of the "chicken or the egg dilemma"
which it presents the analyst. Does doctrine bring about the
development of specific weapons systems to meet the strategic
posture set forth by the doctrine or do weapons systems require
doctrinal justification during their development and/or after
their deployment? This two-way relationship between techno-
logical development and deterrence posture may, in Donald
10

Snow's words, "follow or force a country to adopt certain
doctrines" and necessitates a continuing reassessment of
both doctrine and weapons requirements.
The Vietnam War was chosen for analysis because of its
potential direct and indirect impact on the other variables,
specifically on defense program funding, public opinion, and
on the "world-views" of key personalities in American decision-
making. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau have noted the intriguing
possibility that:
The Vietnam War was a watershed event in the
sense that it has given rise to sharply diver-
gent views on the nature of the international
system and the appropriate international role
for the United States. 6
Analysis of the effects of the Vietnam War will include the
war's effects on the American leadership, the American public
and on defense budgeting.
The public opinion variable, like Vietnam, was selected
for analysis because of its potential wide-ranging effects
on the political leadership and its indirect effects on doc-
trinal support and program funding. To quote Huntington:
If public opinion significantly influenced
military policy, it did not do so directly
but rather through the images which govern-
mental leaders had of public opinion...
Governmental leaders projected onto the
public their own values and concerns.
Images of what the public desires thus
mirror what public officials want.
Huntington's depreciation of the ability of public opinion to
affect events directly aside, the concern of the political
11

leadership with measures of opinion, such as polls, since the
late 1960s is an indicator of public opinion's importance.
Although an inprecise measure, the Gallup Opinion Index is
used for public opinion analysis in this thesis.
Finally, this thesis includes an analysis of key personal-
ities involved in the decision-making process surrounding stra-
tegic doctrine. Four personalities have been chosen for review
because of these individual's apparent impact on the doctrine
associated with their tenure in office. These key individuals
are Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Schlesinger, Secretary
of State Kissinger, and President Carter.
Thus, five sets of domestic variables were selected for
analysis in this thesis to provide information to support or
disprove the basic hypothesis above. The thesis itself is
composed of four chapters in addition to this introduction.
The thesis includes a review of the change in American strate-
gic doctrine, as expressed in the Defense Secretary's annual
statements, between 1965-1980; a description of the evolution
of American deterrence theory; a description and analysis of
the five domestic variables; and, finally, an analysis of the
inter-relationships of these variables and some concluding
remarks
.
A necessary preliminary to the evaluation of the impact
of domestic variables on American strategic doctrine over the
fifteen year period under examination is a review of American
12

doctrine during that period. The next section of the thesis
examines American strategic nuclear doctrine to specify the
changes that occurred between 1965 and 1980.
C. AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: 1965-1980
The Secretary of Defense's annual report to the Congress
may be accepted as the principal enunciation of American stra-
tegic doctrine. Although these reports serve a variety of
purposes, one of their primary functions is "to formulatTe]
policy goals and communicat [e] them to the public, to Congress,
o
and... members of bureaucracies..." They are therefore use-
ful as a broad overview of the subject. Additionally, since
these statements are required on a routine, annual basis, they
provide a reliably continuous indicator of official articula-
tions regarding strategic doctrine.
I have chosen to examine the statements for fiscal years
1965, 1969, 1975, and 1981 for reasons peculiar to each year.
1965 was the final year before the conduct of the Vietnam
War replaced strategic nuclear objectives as the principal
consideration in the Secretary's report. For example, while
the FY 1965 Annual Report addresses both nuclear doctrine
and initial operations in Vietnam, the entire "operational
highlights" chapter for FY 1966 is devoted to combat opera-
9tions in Vietnam. FY 1969 was chosen because of its sub-
mission at the height of America's Vietnam involvement and
because, according to Graham Allison, this year was the first
13

in which the concept of "damage limitation" was removed as
a primary doctrinal concern. FY 1975 was not only the year
in which Secretary Schlesinger ' s "selective targeting options"
concept was enunciated but was also the first full year since
FY 1965 where funding of American involvement in Vietnam was
not a consideration. Finally, FY 1981/PD-59 is addressed as
the culmination of strategic doctrine under the Carter
Administration.
In his Fiscal Year 1965 report, Secretary of Defense
McNamara announced that the American strategic forces program
was designed around two basic concepts:
1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon
the United States and its allies by maintain-
ing a highly reliable ability to inflict an
unacceptable degree of damage on any single
aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even
after absorbing a surprise first strike.
2. In the event such a war nevertheless oc-
curred, to limit damage to our population and
industrial capability .1*
In short, the 1965 strategic doctrine expressed both the con-
cept of "assured destruction," or the survivable and enduring
ability to "inflict unacceptable damage" on the enemy, and the
concept of "damage limitation." McNamara envisioned the latter
concept as an offensive as well as defensive one in which
strategic offensive forces, such as bombers, could be employed
against enemy offensive forces prior to the latter's use. The
1965 Doctrine was announced during a period of clear American
superiority over the Soviets in all strategic systems which
14

could directly threaten the United States. In 1965 the Insti-
tute of Strategic Studies' (ISS) Military Balance estimated
that the United States maintained an almost three to one super-
iority in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) , subma-
i 2
rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) , and heavy bombers.
This superiority in strategic forces allowed the United States
the luxury of the 1965 doctrine.
In 1968, the strategic balance had shifted to the point
where a revision of strategic doctrine was necessary. First,
in 1967 the United States had stabilized its strategic forces
at 1054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and 465 heavy bombers upon comple-
tion of the strategic build-up commenced in the early days
13
of the Kennedy Administration. The Soviets, on the other
hand, had continued expanding their ICBM force to an estimated
1 4
level of between 900-1000 launchers. Although the United
States still retained a four to one advantage in bombers and
SLBMs, this near equality of ICBM forces was noted by McNamara
in his FY 1969 statement. Referring to the Soviet ICBM force
he stated:
To put it bluntly, neither the Soviet Union
nor the United States can now attack the
other, even by complete surprise, without
suffering massive damage in retaliation...
It is precisely this mutual capability to
destroy one another, and, conversely, our
respective inability to prevent such de-
struction, that provides us both with the




In his statement, although not renouncing the concept of
"damage limitation" totally, McNamara had certainly addressed
it in terms of cost effectiveness. He continued:
This is not to say that defense measures
designed to significantly limit damage to
ourselves... might not also contribute to
our deterrent. Obviously they might...
[b]ut for a "Damage Limiting" posture to
contribute significantly to the deterrent
in this way, it would have to be extremely
effective... and... we now have no way of
accomplishing this.^"
Thus the changing balance and the Soviet's ability to limit
damage to themselves had apparently combined to remove "damage
limitation," as a primary objective, from American strategic
doctrine. The ability to visit "assured destruction" on the
adversary was now "mutual." According to William Van Cleave,
"[m]ore emphasis in public statements (and in target and force
planning) came to be placed on Assured Destruction [which was]
now based on the judgemental criterion of 'unacceptable
17damage'." The American doctrine now espoused a policy of
"self-restraint," one in which strategic forces were stabil-
ized to avoid challenging the Soviet's assured destruction
capability. This policy eschewed the goal of superiority and
replaced it with one of parity. Following the enunciation of
this doctrine, and the installation of the Nixon Administration,
the arms control process which would produce Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks agreements (SALT I and II) commenced.
By 1974, the Soviet strategic build-up continued unabated
in spite of American hopes that unilateral American restraint
16

in nuclear arras production and the SALT process would entice
the Soviets to slow down. By mid-1974, the Soviets had in-
creased ICBM and SLBM force levels to 1575 and 660 launchers
respectively while similar American forces remained unchanged
1
8
from 1967. Secretary Schlesinger, like his predecessor
McNamara in 1961, had inherited a doctrine which implied a
tendency to "target Soviet cities initially and massively and
that this [was] the principal option that the President would
19have." In Schlesinger ' s mind this "situation of essential
equivalency" raised the concern of what to do should deter-
rence fail. Schlesinger ' s response to this imbalance was a
doctrine of "selective targeting options" which retained the
concept of "assured destruction" with some specific modifica-
tions. Schlesinger stressed the need for increased flexibility.
While reaffirming the continuance of assured destruction as
a viable strategic concept, Secretary Schlesinger criticized
those who relied solely on its "simple but arcane calculations"
and announced the existence and requirements for "large-scale
pre-planned options other than attacking cities .. .despite
20the rhetoric of assured destruction." Schlesinger ' s stra-
tegic doctrine proposed a wide-range of pre-programmed targets
such as hard and soft strategic targets, airfields, and cities,
in addition to placing an emphasis on weapons of high accuracy
and low yield. To enhance deterrence, Schlesinger wrote,
we may also want a more efficient hard-
target-kill capability than we now
possess: both to threaten specialized
sets of targets... with greater economy
17

of force, and to make it clear to a po-
tential enemy that he cannot proceed
with implority to jeopardize our own
system of hard targets. *-
The doctrine espoused was one which acknowleged the "essential
equivalence" of U.S. and Soviet forces and stressed reliance
on a diversified, survivable American strategic force which
would provide the President with a "wide range of options"
yet avoid "any combination of forces that could be taken as
an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike
22disarming attack against the USSR."
The "countervailing strategy" announced by Secretaries
Brown and Muskie in 1980 is, in essence, a continuation of
the Schlesinger options. The strategic balance of 1980 re-
vealed Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers
and a rapidly vanishing American lead in independently target-
able weapons. In his report Secretary Brown claimed that
American nuclear forces were "in a state of rough quantitative
23parity" with those of the Soviet Union. Brown, as had
Schlesinger, reiterated the limitations of assured destruction
as an "all-purpose standard of deterrence." Brown stressed
that the United States:
. . .must have forces and plans for the use
of our strategic nuclear forces such that
. . . our adversary would recognize that no
plausible outcome would represent a suc-
cess—on [ s ^- c 5 any rational definition of
success .24
The "countervailing strategy" of the FY 1981 statement and




Although the above sketch of American strategic doctrine
from 1965 to date is not intended as an exhaustive discourse
on the subject, it does indicate a series of trends and
changes in that doctrine. First, during these years, declared
doctrine has moved from a total anti-city counter-value pos-
ture to one stressing multiple counter-force options. Secondly,
during this period there has been a total shift from a concept
of "damage limitation" which included air defense, offensive
action, and civil defense to one in which the concept is vir-
tually excluded. Third, this shift to counter-force options
has occurred concurrently with a significant shift in the
strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union from one of three to one U.S. superiority to "parity,"
if not U.S. inferiority. It appears ironic, on the surface
at least, for the United States to have adopted this more
demanding counter-force role in the face of increasingly ad-
verse force levels
.
It is appropriate at this point to include a brief caveat
regarding analysis of declaratory policy and a short disclaimer
regarding concepts of the US/USSR strategic balance.
First, when dealing with articulated policy, such as DOD
annual reports, the reader must be aware that while declared
policy with respect to strategic doctrine might be altered
by different administrations, the targeting policy to support
that doctrine may not. An interesting case study by Desmond
Ball contrasting the counter-force doctrines of McNamara and
19

Schlesinger concludes that Schlesinger ' s counter-force options
of "'small packages of target sets' [were] little different
from the numerous sets of options generated. . . during the
fall 1961 revision of the SIOP [Single Integrated Operations
25
Plan]." However, even though targeting may not change as
a result of a shift in articulated policies, a change in de-
claratory policy remains significant because of the determi-
nants of why a particular time was chosen to imply that the
nation's strategic philosophy had changed. Indeed, a declared
change in official attitudes on strategic nuclear policy can
be representative o f other important changes in foreign
policy.
Secondly, it would be foolish to ignore the importance
of certain external factors, the changing US/USSR strategic
balance for example, in the determination of strategic doc-
trine. As William Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen note, "changes
in the strategic balance, the undiminished determination of
the USSR to expand and modernize its strategic capabilities,
and clear, strongly held differences in Soviet strategic
doctrine and concepts have forced changes in U.S. strategic
thinking." However, as noted above, this thesis is devoted
to an examination of domestic issues involving strategic doc-
trine. The question of the effect of the strategic balance





This thesis attempts to investigate the domestic determi-
nants of these changes in American strategic doctrine. In
the following chapters the aforementioned variables shall be
analyzed to determine their effects in this doctrinal shift.
The following is not intended to be an exhaustive examination
of the variables but rather a survey enabling the reader to
draw inferences regarding their possible causative relation-
ships to doctrine. As previously noted, this thesis shall
also seek to demonstrate the complexity of variable inter-
relationships and the obstacles to deliberate doctrinal change
Before proceeding with an analysis of the five domestic
variables, the pre-1965 intellectual origins of American
deterrence theory must be clarified. The following chapter,
therefore, describes American deterrence theory, the "root"
of the strategic doctrines described above.
21

II. AMERICAN DETERRENCE THEORY §
PRE-1965 STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The dividing line between theory and doctrine is not
always clear. The previous chapter examined the changes in
American strategic doctrine which occurred between 1965 and
1980 but did not deal with the theoretical base of the 1965
doctrine. However, if subsequent doctrinal change is to be
understood, the concepts which led to the formulation of the
initial doctrine must first be identified. This chapter has
two objectives. First it will examine the theoretical form-
ulation of what Bernard Brodie called "the dominant concept
27
of nuclear strategy-deterrence." Secondly, this chapter
will examine how that theory was translated into doctrine in
the twenty years following the Second World War. Through
this review the relationship between American deterrence
theory and its expression in terms of strategic doctrine
shall be clarified. This brief review shall serve as a




As previously noted, American strategic doctrine since
the end of the Second World War has had at its core the con-
cept of deterrence. This concept is a static one stressing
22

the restraint of an opponent's actions through fear of retri-
butive punishment. Citing the dictionary definition of "deter,"
Thomas Schelling explains that this definition:
corresponds to contemporary usage: to
turn aside or discourage through fear;
hence, to prevent from action by fear
of consequences.
Deterrence involves setting the stage -
by announcement, by rigging the trip-
wire, by incurring the obligation -
and waiting . The overt act is up to
the opponent. °
The concept of deterrence, however, is not unique to the
"nuclear age" and history abounds with numerous examples of
restraint of an opponent's action through fear of excessive
potential costs. Russell Weigley in referring to pre-World
War II American coastal fortifications and the "early and
puny" American Navy, asserts that the military policy of the
United States has "always encompassed some reliance on...
armed forces for purposes not adequately delineated by defin-
29ing strategy as the use of combats." Both these military
forces, Weigley concludes, served a deterrent function by
making attacks on American coasts or shipping unattractive
through the threat of losses which would make such attacks
"too costly to be worth attempting." However, with the ad-
vent of nuclear weapons, some of the theoretical assumptions,
which linked deterrence to counter-military actions only,
have been rendered irrelevant. In his Adelphi Paper,
"Rationality in Deterrence," Stephan Maxwell draws the con-
clusion that nuclear weapons in concert with airpower and
23

missiles provide the deterrer with the capability to act
directly against an enemy's population. In his words,
Nuclear weapons, unlike conventional
weapons, could be used in a way that
defeated their purpose by provoking
an annihilating response from the
opponent. Classical strategists had
to consider the limits to effective
military action imposed by factors
of materiel, or geography, or morale,
or skills of generalship. The new
military technology reduced or eli-
minated the importance of these fac-
tors, only to introduce a far more
pervasive limiting factor, the fac-
tor of interest. 3o
The validity of Maxwell's conclusions regarding the relative
value of the classical elements of strategy aside, the point
remains that the coming of the atomic age brought with it a
signifcant shift in theory regarding the employment of military
forces. In his 1946 work, The Absolute Weapon
,
Bernard Brodie
acknowledged this condition when he wrote, "[t]hus far the
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win
31
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them."
The fundamental requirements of an effective deterrent
posture according to Phil Williams, are factors involving
32
communication, capability, and credibility. First, the
adversary must be made clearly aware of both the prohibited
actions and the costs which will be incurred should the pro-
hibition be ignored. Secondly, an effective deterrent assumes
not only the deterrer 's physical capacity to inflict unaccept-
able damage but also presumes a degree of rationality on the
24

part of the challenger. In short, the deterrer's adversary
must be capable of making "cold and sober calculations, weigh-
33ing and balancing the potential costs and gains of any action."
Finally, the deterrent threat must be credible, the threat
must be believable. These requirements, as previously stated,
combine to form a strategy dependent upon non-use. Rather
than the pre-World War II American strategies which depended
i
on employment of military force to achieve military and poli-
tical ends, the new strategy was to be employed in a different
manner. To quote Brodie again, "the sanction [was]... not de-
signed for repeating action. One use of it [would] be fatally
too many. Deterrence [meant] something as a strategic policy
only... [if] the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies
[would] not be called upon to function at all." In sum,
postwar American deterrent theory has been "based upon the
conviction that total nuclear war should be avoided at any
cost." 35
C. DETERRENCE THEORY AND DOCTRINAL FORMULATION
In the first years following the Second World War, al-
though it was acknowledged that atomic weapons had altered
the character of future warfare, several theorists saw
this alteration as only a "compression of the World War II
3fi
strategic bombing campaigns" and not as one which would
require an immediate reformulation of strategic doctrine.
As Henry Kissinger noted, "we added the atomic bomb to our
25

arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking
. ..[w]e saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare
which knew no goal save total victory, and no mode of war ex-
37
cept all-out war."
The acceptance of deterrence theory as an official doctrine
and the development of an appropriate policy to embody that
theory in the immediate postwar period was slowed by the fact
that only the United States possessed the "ultimate weapon,"
and because it was believed that the Soviets were years away
from development of a similar capability. This
absence of any challenge to this speci-
fic capability seemed to imply little
need to analyze that capability. The
deterrent function of the bomb seemed
almost automatic, and seemed to be
more of a fact than a problem needing
analysis . 38
George and Smoke also assert that until 1950 the preconditions
for a sound and analytical deterrence theory were lacking.
The absence of a perceived, credible threat to the American
homeland by the Soviet Union coupled with an acceptance of
Douhet's concept of the potential effectiveness of strategic
39bombing made the "elaboration of the requirements for stra-
40tegic deterrence" seem unnecessary. However, by the 1950s,
a number of domestic and external determinants would combine
to force the transition of deterrence from theory to doctrine.
By 1950 American perception of the Soviet threat had
changed as a function of the loss of the American nuclear
monopoly, the "loss" of China, and conflicts with Soviets in
26

Berlin and elsewhere. This concern with Soviet motives led
to the establishment of an inter-department staff headed by-
Paul Nitze. This group produced what Senator Henry Jackson
would later term "the first comprehensive statement of national
strategy," NSC-68. This document not only expounded the thesis
that communism must be contained, but also spelled out the re-
quirements and provided an "overall definition of goals and a
general statement of methods oriented primarily to the needs of
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the Cold War... a response to existing and future conditions."
In short, NSC-68 linked the concepts of deterrence and contain-
ment together to form the nucleus for American strategic doctrine.
The intervention of the Korean War and the transfer of
Presidential authority from the Truman to the Eisenhower
Administration prevented the actual implementation of the new
American strategic doctrine. However, in early 1954 when
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announced that "the
administration had made 'a basic decision' to adopt a rational
security policy that would 'depend primarily upon a great ca-
pacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our
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own choosing," the shift from theory to doctrine had begun.
This statement of "Massive Retaliation" was based on the pre-
mise that fear of nuclear assault by the United States would
be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from further expan-
sionistic arms. The Eisenhower Administration's strategic
doctrine stressed an increased reliance on nuclear vice
conventional forces in pursuit of deterrence. This move,
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however, was occasioned as much by domestic political factors
to cut military costs as it was by total acceptance of the
theory of deterrence. In the words of Jerome Kahan:
It must be kept in mind that much of
the conflict between the Eisenhower ad-
ministration and its critics was fueled
by domestic political factors, and that
U.S. weapons decisions were therefore
influenced by the need to compromise
with the Congress. Nevertheless, cen-
tral to the great strategic debate of
the late 1950s was a fundamental sub -
stantive disagreement ever the nature
of deterrence in the nuclear age.
This debate revolved around the stability of the strategic
balance and the adequacy of American strategic programs.
Administration opponents, such as Albert Wohlstetter, would
state that the "balance of terror" was less stable than
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assumed and argued that "U.S. systems should be structured
so that Soviet military planners would be persuaded beyond
all reasonable doubt of the impossibility of destroying a
major portion of our nuclear force."
Ultimately, the critics of the Eisenhower Administration's
strategic policy stressed its failure to meet two of Williams'
requirements of deterrence. First the ambiguity of "a time
and place of our choosing" failed to communicate to the
Soviets the exact limits of the prohibition. (This failure
was deliberate, of course, from the Administration's point
of view.) Secondly, over time, the doctrine would lack cre-
dibility in the face of the perception of increased Soviet
ability to strike the American homeland. Questions could
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be raised, as they still are, as to what interest would occa-
sion the employment of massive retaliation. This lack of
specificity affected the doctrine's credibility.
D. MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND ASSURED DESTRUCTION
With the assumption of office by President Kennedy and the
installation of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, the
United States entered into a new era of strategic deterrence
theory. Although, as stated in chapter one, the United States
maintained clear superiority to the Soviet Union in terms of
strategic weapons, in 1961, the perception existed that the
Soviets could still inflict significant damage on American
cities. This outlook was supported by the belief that the
technology of the offense had greatly outstripped that of
the defense. This view was expressed in 1961 by Fredrick
Gareau who wrote:
For the defense to protect its cities by
military means from these weapons of un-
precedented horror, it must intercept all
or virtually all of the offense's bombers
^^
or missiles. This we are told is impossible.
McNamara, although accepting the reality of mutual deter-
rence early on, did not immediately embrace publicly the
doctrine of "assured destruction." The most notable public
expression of McNamara' s initial concept of deterrence was
made in his famous Ann Arbor, Michigan address in 1962.
Therein he set forth his concept of deterrence through
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"Flexible Response" based upon counter-force targeting and
damage-limitation. This theory of deterrence, as paraphrased
by William Van Cleave, was:
based upon the ability to limit damage
in case of war, which would be accom-
plished by U.S. possession of the means
to destroy an enemy's military capa-
bility and by targeting restraint (vis-
a-vis cities) on our own part...
Clearly, cost-effectiveness arguments
against damage limiting had not yet
[in 1963] impressed the Secretary,
nor had the notion that MAD [Mutual
Assured Destruction] partly was syn-
onymous with strategic stability . 4 7
Ultimately, arguments of the lack of "cost-effectiveness"
of active defense systems persuaded McNamara to eschew the
doctrine of "damage limitation." In his book, The Essence
of Security , the former Secretary of Defense would reflect
on a deterrence doctrine based on the "cornerstone.. . . [of
deterrence of] deliberate nuclear attack upon the United
49States or its allies." In short, the success of the assured
destruction doctrine would depend on:
(1) A highly reliable and credible abil-
lity to inflict unacceptable damage on
one's opponent
PLUS
(2) The rejection of potential defense of
cities, population, and industry.
Thus the "McNamara strategy," in essence made American cities
"hostage," recognizing, in Schelling's words, "the importance
of cities... and proposed to pay attention to them in the
event of major war."
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To translate the deterrent theory of assured destruction
into actual policy for force procurement, the Systems Analysis
Branch of the Department of Defense was tasked to develop a
"theory of requirements - a conceptual framework for measuring
the need and adequacy of... strategic forces." Efforts to
determine the "minimum-deterrent," (the forces necessary to
inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets after absorbing
a surprise first-strike) , commenced early in the Kennedy
Administration and continued until the end of 1966. Through
a series of calculations, encompassing such factors as number
of targets involved, weapon yield, accuracy, etc., requirements
were established which allowed translation of doctrine into
capabilities. By 1966, "assured destruction" had been
52quantified.
E. DETERRENCE THEORY/ DOCTRINE : CIRCA 1965
Thus, after twenty years of formulation, internal and
external events produced the deterrence theory of "assured
destruction." Since 1945 the general American concept of
nuclear war has been defined by what Foy Kohler calls "arti-
cles of faith" steming from a perceived massive destructive-
ness of nuclear weapons . This viewpoint concludes that
because of the perception of massive lethality of nuclear
weapons, there can be no victor in nuclear war, thus the
53
only rational course for nuclear powers is deterrence.
Eventually these "articles of faith" produced the theory of
assured destruction based upon:
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(1) The possession of invulnerable retal-
iatory forces and the political will to
employ them.
(2) A multiplicity of forces to ensure
the survival of at least a "minimum deter-
rent" capable of wreaking unacceptable
damage.
By 1965 these prerequisites of assured destruction had resulted
in the creation of the "Strategic Triad" of land-based ICBMs,
submarine- launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and of a
strategic force-level predicted by "cost-effective" systems
analysis. By 1965, however, also came an increasing acceptance
of the logical successor to assured destruction. This theory
assumes that:
if each side has a similarly protected
and invulnerable force, there will be
no opportunity and therefore no incen-
tive for either to buildup a so-called
counter-force capability. In this situ-
ation, an attack is deterred by the cer-
tain knowledge that it Will be followed
by a devastating reply.
Thus by 1965 mutual deterrente through Mutual Assured De-
struction (MAD) was the theory underlying American strategic
nuclear doctrine, a condition which exists in 1980. However,
as noted in chapter I of this thesis, although the theory has
remained constant, the public articulation of the doctrine's
meaning and applications continues to change in response to
internal and external stimuli. The next chapter of this
thesis will examine the effects of the five selected domestic
determinants of the doctrine.
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III. THE DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS:
DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters of this thesis have primarily invest-
igated the theoretical dimensions of American strategic doctrine
and not the variables which lead to doctrinal formulation or
change. This chapter will directly address the five domestic
determinants identified in chapter I. In this chapter, each
variable will be outlined in an attempt to determine its direct
effect on the changes in strategic doctrine which occurred be-
tween 1965 and 1980. The purpose of this chapter will be to
identify the direct impacts of each individual variable, as
much as this is possible, and not to dwell on how change was
effected by their inter-relationships. These complex inter-
relationships will be addressed in the concluding chapters of
the thesis.
Threat perceptions will be discussed first because each
of the remaining four variables is to some degree dependent
upon the "nature of the threat."
B. THREAT PERCEPTIONS
In dealing with "threat perceptions" it is often difficult
to segregate the internal from external dimensions. Because
policy-makers deal with an external force, they are, to some
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degree, constrained regarding the options available to directly
effect that force. However, there are also internal dimensions
of threat perceptions. As Endicott and Stafford state:
... the perception of threat is a major
determinant in the establishment of a
national strategy ... [for] once the per-
ception of the threat is incorporated in
the general public, congressional support
for measures to increase security gains
momentum. **
Alteratidn of domestic public opinion, and an indirect relation-
ship with increased defense spending, are but two examples of
the scope of the effect of the threat perception variable.
Carl Marcy has made a similar point: M [i]n a democratic
society... perceptions or, regrettably, misperceptions , if
widely held, become the basis for policy." Indeed, as the
two previous chapters have demonstrated, American strategic
doctrine since 1945 has been directly influenced by the actions
of the Soviet Union and assessments made by the American polit-
ical leadership of Soviet intentions and capabilities.
There, of course, have been numerous examples of misper-
ception regarding the Soviet threat since the end of the Second
World War. The bomber and missile "gap" debates of the late
1950s are only two examples of this. Part of this difficulty
stems from disagreement over what indicators are the most im-
portant measures of Soviet capabilities and intentions. For
example, in 1975, Foreign Policy carried a lengthy debate by
Albert Wohlstetter, Jeremy Stone, and others on the topic of
the existence of an "arms race" between the United States and
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the Soviet Union. One of the few conclusions reached in
this series was that made by Michael Nacht who wrote that
"the world of strategic weaponry is dynamic and complex,
subject to examination using a variety of inadequate and
57frequently contradictory indicators." A more recent ex-
ample of difficulty in measurement concerns the determina-
tion of levels of defense spending by the Soviet Union. The
1976 decision by the CIA that the Soviets were devoting 11-131
of their GNP to defense expenditures, vice the 6-8% previously
58predicted, indicates once again the complexity of measurement
and the interpretation of results.
Difficulty arises, however, in the measurement of how a
"threat" is perceived by a nation's general populace and by
its political leadership. To quote George Gallup,
[a]ccuracy of American perceptions of the
Soviet Union depends almost entirely on
reports supplied by the press and on the
published remarks of political leaders
of the United States. The attitudes of
The American People are based chiefly
upon these perceptions so gained.
Thus, perception of the Soviet threat is filtered through a
number of conceptual lenses before it is presented to the
American public. "Raw data," measuring Soviet defense expend-
itures, hardware development, and so forth, are filtered
through the various bureaucracies and agencies, such as the
CIA, the uniformed services, and the State Department, where
the threat is perceived in terms of actual external occurrences
and internal organizational biases. From the agencies, the
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"filtered" information is consolidated by the National Security
Council (NSC) and presented to the President for decision-
making purposes. The President's perceptions are shaped by
his own world views and the positions taken by his advisors.
Without developing the question of small-group dynamics with
respect to presidential decision-making, let it suffice to say
that these advisors can offer support to the President in his
choice as well as an image of legitimacy for the final decision.
It should be noted that most presidential advisors are chosen
for their close relationship with the President and their posi-
... . £ . . . . 60tions may primarily reinforce his viewpoint.
The resultant perception is presented to the public via
the news media in official pronouncements, interviews and
"leaks." The filtering process of threat perception is dia-
gramatically represented in Figure 1, following.
This thesis, therefore, will deal with two measures of
threat perception. First, public statements of major policy-
makers, such as the President and the Secretary of State,
shall be examined to determine how threat perceptions have
been authoritatively articulated. Secondly, public opinion
measurements shall be examined to determine the correla-
tion of that rhetoric with the views of the American people.
These measures shall then be compared with the Department
of Defense annual statements to determine the degree to
which rhetoric and public opinion parallel shifts in strategic
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1. Definition and Measurement
In 1965, the public articulation of the threat showed
the tension of the "ending" Cold War. In the Spring of that
year, statements by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk reflected
concern over Soviet naval harassment of American warships and
Soviet provision of war supplies to the North Vietnamese.
However, as the year progressed, a relaxation developed in
East-West relationships through an acceptance of multiple
centers of power in the communist world. In The Faces of
Power , Seyom Brown reflects on this period by writing,
[i]n 1965-1966 the writings of Brzezinski
and others, speeches by Administration
spokesmen... all... signaled the early
phases of an adjustment of United States
policy premises to the more pluralistic
world we claimed to want..." 2
The total atmosphere of this period of tension and expanding
contacts between East and West is best captured in a state-
ment made by Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in August 1965. The Secretary of State allowed
that,
[t]here is no question that our rela-
tions at the present time are under
strain. There is no question that
the dangerous situation in Southeast
Asia has intefered significantly with
the search for further points of agree-
ment which many of us had hoped we
could find following this signature of
the nuclear test ban treaty. 63
In short the Soviet threat, as articulated in 1965, remained
serious although the outlook appeared hopeful for increased
contacts and lessened tension.
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This tone of optimism continued through 1968. At the
height of American involvement in Vietnam, the official image
of the Soviet Union was much less threatening than that de-
picted in the early 1960s. Speaking in June 1968 at Glassboro
State College, President Lyndon Johnson recalled his summit
meeting with Soviet Chairman Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro a
year earlier and stated,
This has been a time of unusual strain
and difficulty. But what period in
our history has been more productive
in promoting cooperation between our
two countries?
-
Many feared that the War in Vietnam
would prevent any progress ... [b]ut
despite the predictions and the dif-
ficulties, we have agreed upon a treaty
outlawing armaments in outer space.
We have negotiated a treaty banning
the spread of nuclear weapons ... [a]nd
^^
we are moving toward other agreements.
The importance of the maintenance of this perception of "coop-
eration" between the United States and the Soviet became
readily apparent in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968. Although Johnson would later refer
to the Soviet action as a "callous, outrageous assault,"
in the months which immediately followed the Soviet action
the Administration's articulated position appeared to almost
explain away the invasion. In December 1968, when asked,
during a television interview, if the August invasion sig-
naled a return by the Soviets to a policy of confrontation
with the West, Secretary Rusk responded,
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[it has] become apparent that it is too
late in history for opposing blocs to
pursue a policy of total hostility, that
an effort must be made to find points of
agreement
.
There are reasons to believe that the
Soviet Union is prepared to continue to
try to find points of possible agree-
ment, despite the fact that the Czecho-
slovak matter was a major interruption
from the point of view of the rest of us.
I don't have the impression that the
Soviet Union is seeking a major
confrontation ."^
Thus through 1968, the Johnson Administration sought to
portray a less threatening image of the Soviet Union to the
American public. The changed strategic balance may have been
part of the reason behind the rhetorical shift, as might have
been the need to portray the Johnson Administration as pro-
gressing down the "road to peace" during a time when that
Administration was receiving severe criticism for its Vietnam
policies. Another plausible explanation is that Administration
spokesmen viewed such events as the Glassboro Summit, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,, and the initial overtures
which would lead to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
as evidence that the Soviet Union was truly interested in a
more cooperative relationship with the United States. Addi-
tionally, the Sino-Soviet split, described by Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara in his annual statement to Congress
in 1968, may have also downgraded the potential of the Soviet
threat to some administration policy-makers. McNamara' s per-
ception of the threat was articulated as follows:
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On the whole, the strident behavior of
the Peking regime has caused the Soviet
leadership- -both Khrushchev and his suc-
cessors—to confront the fact that they,
too, have an interest in stability that
has to be balanced off against continued
adherence to ideology.
• • • •
The Soviets since 1962 have generally
taken a less militant approach [to
"world revolution"] . . . The Soviet leader-
ship has demonstrated some restraint in
their support for North Vietnam and in
support of insurgencies in some other
areas of the world. '
Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was per-
ceived as still a threat to American security interests, but
also as a nation with mutual interests with the United States
in the preservation of the established order. The key to
further cooperation and less confrontation with the Soviet
Union was, in McNamara's words, the "task of creative state-
manship for the West."
This spirit of cooperation, later labeled "detente,"
would persist through the 1970s, and be heralded as a "new
69period of relationships." As in the late 1960s, mutual
agreements such as SALT I, the 1971 Berlin Accords and an
increasing economic involvement between the two nations was
perceived as further evidence of mutual interest and improving
relations. Administration spokesmen continued to present the
American people with both the benefits and the limitations of
detente. In 1974 Assistant Secretary of State, Arthur Hartman
presented a paper which acknowledged that "...habits formed
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by both sides during twenty years of confrontation are not
easily set aside. We recognize, moreover, that there is no -
a uniform perception in this country... of the meaning of
j * * ..70detente."
A positive perception of the Soviet Union, as it had in
1968, carried over into the Secretary of Defense's Annual
statement. Although specific in his warnings of an increas-
ing Soviet conventional and nuclear capability and caution-
71
ary regarding reliance "solely on fond hopes or soft words"
to meet this threat, Secretary Schlesinger was generally
optimistic regarding future prospects for long-term mutual
agreements. Schlesinger perceived the Soviets in 1974 as
sober, prudent and having mutually recognized that "there
72
is no good alternative to peaceful cooperation."
The first three years of the Carter Administration pro-
duced little shift in the articulated perception of the
threat on the part of Administration spokesmen. In his
landmark address on U.S. -Soviet Relations, presented at the
1978 Naval Academy Commencement, President Carter referred
to a "competitive" relationship between the two super-
powers and, although acknowledging some "significant dif-
ferences" between the United States and the Soviet Union,
concluded that he was
convinced that the people of the Soviet
Union want peace. I can't believe that
they could possibly want war. 73
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Following the December 1979 Invasion of Afghanistan, however,
the perception of a competitive yet cooperative relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union was severely-
altered. The rhetoric of President Carter's 1980 "State of
the Union" message shows a profound shift in official per-
ceptions and is most significant when compared with Secretary
Rusk's post-Czechoslovakia statements from 1968. The per-
ception articulated by President Carter was one of the serious
threat posed by the Soviet Union. In his "State of the Union"
address in January 1980, President Carter announced:
We sought to establish rules of behavior
that would reduce the risk of conflict
and we searched for areas of cooperation
that could make our relations reciprocal
and productive.
• • • •
But now the Soviet Union has taken a rad-
ical and aggressive new step... [t]he
implications of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan could pose the most serious
threat to peace since the Second World
War. 74
With Carter's "State of the Union" speech of 1980, artic-
ulated perceptions of the Soviet threat had come full circle
from a period of "hopeful optimism" in 1965 to the "most
serious threat to peace since the Second World War" in 1980.
This perception, articulated by the political leadership,
was generally shared by the general populace, most likely
because of the effectiveness of the leadership in conveying
their perceptions to the public
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Although the effects of public opinion on strategic doc-
trine will be dealt with later in this chapter, it is useful
at this point to utilize some measures of public opinion to
determine if a correlation existed between the leadership
and public perceptions of a changing relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Official perceptions
indicated a relaxation of tensions from 1965 to 1974, a mix-
ture of cooperation and competition through 1979 and a sharp
return to "Cold War" rhetoric in 1980. The 1978 report to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Perceptions of
US/USSR Relations provided two measures of the public's per-
ception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the
first, George Gallup using a Stapel Scale survey to rank-order
"favorable ratings" of various countries by Americans produced
the following results:




(Gallup concluded that the fall in
rating between 1973 and 1976 was due,
in part, to a "widespread feeling" that
the Soviets had gotten the better of
the United States in SALT I) 75
The second measure, provided by Charles Marcy in the
same Senate committee report, linked perceptions of the









The conclusions which may be drawn from the above, taken
together with the official statements, are that some degree
of tension existed in American perceptions of the Soviet Union
throughout the 1965-1980 period. Between 1965 and 1974 de-
creasing tensions, positive official rhetoric, and mutual
agreements led to more positive perceptions of the intentions
of the Soviet Union by the general populace. Although the
official perception of the Soviet Union, as articulated by
Secretary Schlesinger and President Carter remained increas-
ingly positive until the invasion of Afghanistan, the per-
ception of the general public, indicated by the "fear of
communism" and "favorable impression" indices, became less
positive regarding the Soviet Union as early as 1974. It
was not until 1980 that the Administration dramatically
altered its position.
2 . Perceptions and Strategic Doctrine
The primary concern of this section is the effect
that threat perception has on strategic doctrine. This
relationship is apparent in the proposed force levels found
in the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, for it is




The FY 1965 Report does not contain a specific statement
of the threat, but the public rhetoric of the period shows
little change from the Cold War period. There are few changes
in strategic forces as the FY 65 program generally carried
on the strategic build-up commenced in 1961.
The FY 1969 Report, however, specifically addressed the
ideological and military dimensions of the communist threat.
The doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" was fostered by
a perception that the Soviets shared a number of mutual inter-
ests with the U.S. (not the least of which was a "justly-held
77fear of nuclear war") and a growing Soviet strategic
arsenal. Likewise the perception of increased militancy on
the part of the Chinese was used to partially justify deploy-
ment of a limited Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) system to
counter that potential threat.
The FY 1974 Report, although optimistic in several re-
spects regarding future grounds for mutual restraint, speci-
fically dealt with the closing nuclear and conventional
7 8gaps. Uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions and cer-
tainty regarding increased military capabilities contributed
to the "flexible targeting doctrine" to counter a perceived
Soviet advantage. Likewise, conventional options, speci-
fically naval force expansion, were stressed to offset
perceived asymmetries. The strategic doctrine/threat per-
ception relationship here appeared to be a need to redress
the military balance to prevent the Soviets from perceiving
lack of American resolve.
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Regrettably it is difficult to prove a relationship be-
tween threat perception and doctrine in the early years of
the Carter Administration due to the lack of consistent per-
ception or doctrinal articulation. The Soviet Union was
generally perceived as benign by the Administration until
1979 and only then was an attempt made to link threat per-
ception to publicly articulated strategic doctrine. However,
the establishment of the countervailing strategy in Secretary
Brown's FY 1980 Defense Budget shows the beginning of a shift
in perceptions which would be complete by January of 1980
and the President's "State of the Union" message. Since
1965, threat perception on the part of the political leader-
ship has been conveyed to the general public through official
rhetoric and statements. However, public opinion can also
be a determinant of strategic doctrine, a factor which shall
be addressed in the following section.
C. THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLE
As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, the effects
of public opinion on attitudes and doctrine are somewhat in-
direct, a fact which is further complicated by sampling
techniques which have some inherent limitations. In 1976,
Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic referred to these limita-
tions when they wrote that:
[w]arnings against the uncritical reading
of percentages from public opinion surveys
are very common, and appropriate. Responses
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are heavily influenced by transitory fac-
tors such as question wording, salience
of an issue at the moment, the position
Cor absence of a position) by government
and opinion leaders, and the respondents'
mood. An individual who disapproves of
a hypothetical course of action when
asked his opinion by a pollster may react
very differently if the President of the
United States actually initiates or pro-
poses the action. "79
Likewise, polling techniques such as the Gallup Poll's in-
home interview, to a degree, have a "status-conferring"
effect with respect to the respondent who may give an
opinion on a subject in which he has neither interest nor
knowledge.
However, regardless of their imperfections, public opin-
ion polls remain valuable to the degree that they reflect
the public's mood on given questions of national security.
While public opinion per se may have little direct effect
on strategic doctrine or military force levels, the images
of the public mood held by governmental decision-makers may
effect these concepts dramatically. Although not a sup-
porter of the concept that public opinion can direct defense
policy, Samuel Huntington wrote in 1961 that, if
...public opinion significantly influ-
enced military policy, it did not do
so directly but rather though the images
which governmental leaders had of public
opinion and the extent to which they
were able to persuade other leaders that
their images were accurate. 81
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Political leaders are keenly aware of the need for accuracy
in their perception of public attitudes for, as Russett
infers, there are "penalties" for raisperception, i.e. the
8 2loss of political office.
Four questions related to national security shal be exam-
ined to determine the opinions of the public and the rela-
tionship of these attitudes to strategic doctrines.
1. The Surveys
The measures chosen for evaluation are responses to
questions regarding "the most important problem facing the
nation today," the adequacy of defense spending, the willing-
ness to use force to achieve political ends, and finally the
willingness of the public to employ nuclear weapons.
Since 1950 some variant of the question "what do you
think is the most important problem facing this country
today?" has been asked by the Gallup Poll at least annually
8 3
with the exception of 1952 and 1961. Until 1973, without
exception, the highest ranking problem related in some way
to national security. Most responses were general, such as
"fear of war" or "relations with Russia." However, between
May 1965 and September 1972 the single most important pro-
blem to the majority of Americans surveyed was the Vietnam
War.
In 1973, there occurred a significant shift of concern
With conclusion of American combat involvement in Vietnam
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came a preoccupation with internal matters. In the spring
of that year the "most important problem" was "domestic
84
order and stability," according to 37% of those surveyed.
Increasing oil prices, inflation, and decreasing standards
of living in America combined to ensure a domestically-
related response ("high cost of living," "energy," etc.)
until January 1980. According to Russett, this 1973 shift
of opinion relected that the "Cold War sense of urgent threat
8 5[was] gone from most American's political consciousness"




It took the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and President
Carter's "State of the Union" message to break this trend
of internal preoccupation. The February 1980 Gallup Opinion
Index indicated in a survey conducted between 25 and 28
January 1980 that 441 of those surveyed responded that "inter
national problems/foreign affairs" constituted the "most im-
portant problem facing the nation" at that time, reflecting
as Gallup concluded, "widespread and growing concern over
8 7Soviet military actions in Afghanistan." This "wide-
spread concern" with international problems would fade by
March 1980 when "inflation/high cost of living" would poll
8 8
741 and "international affairs" would drop back to 17%.
Willingness of American to support higher levels of
defense spending follows generally the same pattern as the
"most important problem" index. Whereas in the 1950s, less
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than 20% of those surveyed favored cuts in defense spending.
Between 1968 and 1974 a total of ten Gallup opinion Polls
indicated that more than 50% of the respondents favored some
89
cuts in defense appropriations. " Following September 1974,
however, this opposition to defense spending gradually-
decreased, being exceeded by both the responses "too little"
and "about right" in July 1977. 90
American responses regarding the employment of conven-
tional and nuclear force offer significant insight into
American willingness to use force in pursuit of foreign
policy objectives. Results of a 1969 Louis Harris survey
and a 1975 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll reveal
that Americans are highly selective in their willingness to
use force abroad. Use of force appears determined by the
nature of the threat and the country being invaded. The
primary conclusion drawn by Russett and Nincic from these
sruveys is that Americans appear to be willing to use force
in support of those nations, such as Canada, Mexico, Great
Britain, or West Germany, which are physically or socio-
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culturally "close" to the United States. However, in
conmparing the relative "isolationism" of Americans in the
periods of 1938-1941 and 1969-1975, Russett and Nincic also
concluded that:
...in a number of instances, the highest
percentage of Americans willing to use
American troops in defense of any of these
countries in the recent period is lower




Russett and Nincic also concluded that the trends of relative
isolationism in the 1970s tend to parallel public resistance
to additional military spending. The authors state that this
generally less favorable disposition towards further defense
spending and military intervention was a product of internal
changes in the United States, the Vietnam War, and detente.
However, it is in the area of nuclear weapons where the
most 'significant potential ramifications of public opinion
exist. Prior to 1963, American concern with nuclear war was
at its peak. In a 1973 Foreign Policy article, Rob Paarlberg
evaluated American attitudes toward nuclear war through con-
tent analysis of the periodical literature. Measuring the
total of nuclear war-related articles he found that these
peaked with a total of 450 in 1962, declined through 125 in
93
1965, finally Mbottoming-out" at 60 articles in 1971.
Paarlberg concluded that thir trend away from confronting
the question of nuclear war was a clear example of "issue
avoidance" on the part of a populace "pushed beyond the
94threshold of public distress." While Paarlberg's inter-
pretation of the American public's reluctance to deal with
the question of nuclear war may not be totally correct,
opinion surveys indicated an extreme reluctance to employ
nuclear weapon. Referring again to the Russett and Nincic
results, one becomes aware that the general public is ex-
tremely hesitant to employ nuclear weapons. The 1969 survey
results reflected in Table 3 of their article show that only
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an invasion of Canada or Mexico produced a greater than seven
95percent affirmative response regarding use of nuclear weapons.
Equally telling was the response to a 1970 Harris poll in
which only 26% of the respondents could conceive of any cir-
96
cumstances which would necessitate nuclear war. These re-
sults led Russett and Nincic to conclude that "public
willingness to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of allies
is extremely low, much lower than willingness [in the 1950s]
97
to employ forces at all."
2 . The Impact on Doctrine
As noted above by Huntington and others, the public's
impact on doctrine is indirect. However since 1965, concern
with the public's attitude has, to a degree, shaped the
development of strategic doctrine. As Russett noted, it
would be difficult for political leaders to ignore the anti-
military spending attitudes reflected in the polls between
1968 and 1974, especially when a break-down of the respon-
ents indicated a high percentage of those favoring cuts in
military spending were members of professional groups, and
of high income and education. To quote Russett,
...anti-military spending attitudes
[were] concentrated precisely among
those most likely to take an interest
in international affairs, to vote, to
make campaign contributions, and other-
wise to be politically active. 98
As shall be shown later, these anti-spending attitudes would
be manifested in the creation of anti-military, spending blocs
in the House and Senate.
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Additionally, concern with domestic reluctance to embrace
a new strategic doctrine may also inhibit the announcement
of a new strategic doctrine. In his paper regarding the re-
turn to the 1962 "Ann Arbor" counter-force strategy in the
form of the "Schlesinger Doctrine," Desmond Ball suggests
that at least part of the reason for delaying its announce-
ment until 1974 was because the
...domestic American political situation
ruled out any earlier public announcement.
The weapons developments associated with
the new strategy would have to be justi-
fied in light of the post-SALT I environ-
ment and, although not banned by the May
1972 accords, would have opened the
Administration to charges of bad faith...
[and] would perhaps seem inconsistent with
the proclaimed detente and President Nixon's
generation of peace.""
Likewise, the low level of American support for the use
of nuclear weapons in general can impact on the credibility
of the deterrent expressed in specific doctrine. Reflecting
on Schlesinger 's attempt to offset a low-level of popular
support for commitment of troops outside of the Western
Hemisphere with the assertion of a readiness to use nuclear
weapons, Russett and Nincic wrote that
the irony is that such action would run
directly counter to the wishes of the
American public as expressed in opinion
surveys . The use of nuclear weapons...
would be approved by only a very small
percentage of the populace. ^°
This lack of popular support for the use of nuclear weapons
in most circumstances could complicate the post-hoc political
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justification of their employment. However, one must also
recall that the public's opinion may be radically different
during an international crisis than it is in a series of
living-room interviews. It is also important to consider
the so called "main-steam" effect. This model hypothesizes
that as members of the public become more informed regarding
specific political policies, through exposure to influences
such as the mass media, they begin to form greater attach-
ment to the official policy and develop a greater degree of
conformity between their positions and official policy.
Both of positions above show the potential for a major shift
in public opinion to the support of official policy in times
of crisis regardless of previous levels of popular support
of that policy.
The conclusion drawn from the above is that although
public opinion effects strategic doctrine indirectly its
most important function is the establishment of boundaries
for doctrinal and foreign policy formulation. Perceptions
formed by decision-makers regarding the public's willingness
to financially or morally support a specific force level or
doctrine limit the leadership's ability to operationalize
doctrine. During the 1960s and early 1970s, American con-
cerns for national security, measured in willingness to
support increased defense spending, the relative importance
of foreign affairs, and public attitudes regarding the use
of force, decreased. The resurgence of the public's support
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for the first two of these measures occurred only in the
latter part of the 1970s and fluctuates significantly with
changes in the internal and international environments. The
most significant effect of public opinion on strategic doc-
trine, however, resulted in conjunction with declining
popular support for the Vietnam War, a relationship which
will be dealt with in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
However, strategic doctrine is also a function of the
weapons systems developed to operationalize that doctrine,
a point which shall be examined in the next section.
D. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
Since the advent of nuclear weapons and the major shifts
in strategic doctrine which occurred between 1945 and 1965,
American strategists have debated regarding "technical
dynamism," or the role of technology in the determination
102
of doctrine. One school of thought maintains that ra-
tional calculations, based upon strategic doctrine, deter-
mine the weapons development process. On the other hand,
writers such as John Morse maintain that rapidly advancing
technology provides its own impetus and that doctrine must
at times be radically altered to accommodate technological
progress. In 1975 Morse proclaimed,
...technology is the driving force that
demands frequent and often drastic changes
in approaches to military problems.
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The assumption that current military
thinking, strategies, and concepts deter-
mine the development of new weapons and
weapon systems is not always valid...
progress in technology has... substan-
tially altered some of the assumptions
on which existing strategic and opera-
tional concepts, force structures, and
the organization of military units and
services are based. ^-^^
Coupled with this concept of technical dynamism is the
fact that the weapons procurement process is not only com-
plicated by the inter-relationship of doctrine and technology,
but also by the impact of bureaucratic politics. As Ted
Greenwood acknowledged in 1975,
[t]he real world of policy-making is com-
plex and multi-faceted. Large numbers of
actors, both individual and institutional,
have stakes in and participate in the
decision-making process for any expensive
or important weapons system. Each has
its own interests and perspectives, its
own routine and style of operation, its
own political environment .104
The purpose of this section is to investigate the concept
of technical dynamism in order to determine to what degree
the weapon system choices and the strategic doctrine between
1965 and 1980 determined one another. To accomplish this
the literature of the subject will be reviewed and the case
of the MIRV will be investigated as a potential example of
technology determining both the systems and the strategic
doctrine.
In classical cases involving the advent of a new tech-
nology, such as the invention of atomic weapons, the ability
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of technology to radically alter strategic thought cannot be
denied. However, most cases of weapons system development
since 1945 have not been quite so clear cut. Since the
end of the Second World War, a large and sophisticated tech-
nology-based industry has developed to serve both civilian
and military concerns. This worldwide "explosion" of
scientific knowledge has generated pressures for "insurance"
to develop and employ the latest nuclear weapons and delivery
system technology, regardless of strategic doctrine, to avoid
"falling behind" the Soviet Union technologically. These
pressures to deploy a given technology as soon as it is
"sweet" were reflected by Robert McNamara, who wrote:
[t]here is a kind of mad momentum intrin-
sic to the development of all new nuclear
weaponry. If a weapon works - and works
well - there is a strong pressure from
many directions to procure and deploy the
weapon out of all proportion of the level
required. 105
Weapons development and procurement in the United States,
according to James Kurth, are based on four broad criteria.
First is the strategic criterion or rational calculations
determining the forces required to operationalize the
nation's strategic doctrine. Secondly, there are the
bureaucratic pressures from individual military and scien-
tific institutions as they compete among one another in
support of weapon systems which will either provide them a
larger share of available assets or enhance traditional
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mission structures. Finally there are the economic and the
"democratic" imperatives for system development, although
Kurth admits these latter criteria are of greater importance
in the selection of conventional aerospace systems, such as
aircraft, than they are with strategic weapons.
The development of the Multiple Independently-targeted
Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) system strongly reflects both the
strategic and bureaucratic imperatives. Officialy, MIRV was
developed and justified inaccordance with the counter-force
targeting doctrine and to assist in penetration of a develop-
ing Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. In Hearings
on Military Posture conducted by the Congress in 1969 and in
the FY 1969 Appropriations Hear ings , Air Force and Navy spokes-
men claimed that increased requirements for improved target
coverage in the late 1950s, "sanctioned and reenforced" by
the counter-force targeting doctrine of the 1960s, led to the
development of MIRV, which was seen as an "economical means
of increasing the target coverage of the ballistic missile
107force." Thus the "multiple triggers" of a Soviet ABM
threat, an expanded target list, and the justification of
strategic doctrine presumably led to the development of MIRV.
However, various interpretations of MIRV's development
indicate that much more was involved than adherence to stra-
tegic doctrine and an expanded target list. First, according
to Ted Greenwood, as the need for a hard-target kill capa-
bility became more intriguing in the later McNamara years
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years and as the concerns regarding ABM penetration lessened,
MIRV became a more attractive system because of its ability
to destroy "time-urgent targets like the long-range weapons
108
of the enemy." Secondly, referring back to MIRV's initial
conception, the available evidence leads one to conclude that
at least part of the reason for MIRV's genesis came from a
need to "elaborate challenges U.S. designers of ABM would
have to face in meeting an attack that employed penetration
aids." 109 Thus, to paraphrase Herbert York, MIRV and ABM
researchers developed a sequence of challenge and response
to provoke one another to further system development.
As Allison and Huff describe this sequence,
The technical community seems to have
been driven by the "sweetness' of the
technology and the researchers' com-
petitive instinct... This competion...
generates what we might label an intra-
national action-reaction phenomena. *-*• ^
Thus, at least in the case of MIRV, technological competition
seems to have been the primary "trigger" in the system's
development rather than the creation of a system to match
the nation's strategic doctrine. However, although MIRV
was justified in terms of strategic doctrine it does not
appear to have determined it. The role of doctrine in such
cases is important; however,. as Greenwood states,...
...strategic views are merely one of
several criteria that a decision-maker
uses to choose among the vast panoply
of programs that continually drift up
through the system for his review. .
.
strategic perspectives .. .play a role in
determining which programs survive and
which do not. 112
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In spite of this, force development since 1965 appears
more a function of justifying old systems rather than develop-
ing new strategic doctrine in terms of the latest technology.
Although Allison, Huff, and Greenwood have demonstrated the
potential for technology to trigger its own development, as
in the case of MIRV, this is only part of the relationships
between technology and strategy. The true relationship is
more along the lines of the three-way relationship proposed
by Donald Snow in his article, "Current Nuclear Deterrence
113Thinking." A deterrent strategy will impose parameters
on development, availability of certain technologies will
create the need to reassess doctrines or systems (as was
the case when increasing missile accuracy raised the spectre
of ICBM vulnerability) . Finally in the case of unforeseen
weapons innovation, such as MIRV, there is the requirement
for doctrinal justification after the fact.
However, one must also consider that on some occasions,
technology may have been suppressed because of doctrinal
considerations. William Van Cleave, referring to the devel-
opment of Poseidon, asserts that "quandary of MIRV and MAD
was eased by deliberately avoiding effective hard target
MIRVs... and designing them mostly to offset ABM and to in-
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crease soft target coverage." Likewise Albert Wohlstetter
concludes that in spite of technologiecal momentum, the
policy-maker's ability to choose between projects has re-
sulted in "a very long list of development projects... can-
celled after much spending but before deployment."
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One must also consider that the results of "intra-national"
competition in the weapons' industry are not totally bad and
can, in fact, produce better, more survivable systems. In
an environment where the adversary's developmental intentions
may not be clear until a new system is deployed, such com-
petition may be the best "insurance" against technological
surprise available.
Finally, future technological developments may, i,n fact,
assist in operationalizing a declaratory posture. Recent and
expected advances in cruise missile technology have great
potential for providing the incoming Administration with the
necessary assets for the counter-force targeting requirements
established in the countervailing strategy of PD-59.
Thus, for the most part doctrine and technology inter-
related. While there is the potential for a major reassess-
ment and redirection of strategic doctrine resulting from a
technological innovation, for the most part American weapon
system development between 1965 and 1980 resulted from
attempts to develop or justify forces in terms of doctrine.
As indicated by Greenwood, the role of the decision-maker
is of great importance in the selection of the systems needed
to operationalize a given strategy. What he does not mention
is the importance of the individual in the formulation of
strategic doctrine in the first place. The following section
of this chapter will address the role of the major personal-
ities of the last fifteen years and how their belief systems
affected the strategic doctrines associated with them.
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E. PERSONALITIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
The potential of the individual policy-maker to influence
public opinion, articulate doctrine, and affect selection of
specific weapons cannot be ignored. In Ted Greenwood's words,
The management, techniques, and style of
the Secretary of Defense affect the degree
of control he exercises over the weapons
acquisition process and his policy pre-
ferences can affect the type of weapons
developed and deployed. -*-
Likewise, the belief system of a major actor can deter-
mine the structure that his policy preferences will take.
This "image of the world," held as a general set of beliefs
and premises regarding fundamental issues of history and the
effects of politics on these issues, forms what Alexander
George refers to as the "operational code" of the policy-
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maker. As Harvey Starr writes in his analysis of Henry
Kissinger's "operational code,"
Decision-makers, as all other human beings,
can act only in terms of their image of the
world... they as subjected to a wide vari-
ety of psychological processes that affect
perception and behavior. As a result of
these processes, an individual possesses
a belief system composed of images which
are the products of past experiences,
values, attitudes, personality factors,
and the like... such factors are impor-
tant in a decision-maker's selection of
a problem, in his identification of the
alternatives to solving that problem, and
ultimately the choice of a path of action
to meet that problem. H°
This use of the "operational code" to predict how an actor
will react or to explain how a decision-maker chose a specific
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alternative is useful to the analyst in understanding the
effect of the individual or policy-making as a whole. In
this section, the "world-views" or belief systems of Robert
McNamara, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Jimmy
Carter shall be determined through an analysis of some of
their writings and public speeches and through the use of
secondary sources that perform related analyses. An attempt
shall then be made to demonstrate how these operational codes
affected the policy preferences of these individuals with
respect to strategic doctrine in order to determine the
effect that an individual policy-maker might have on doc-
trinal development. The operational code approach is not
perfect in its ability to determine the effect of an actor
on policy. As Alexander George wrote, while
knowledge of the actor's approach to cal-
culating choices of action does not pro-
vide a simple key to explanation and
prediction... it can help the researcher
and the policy planner to 'bound' the
alternative ways in which the subject
may perceive different types of stimulus
and approach the task of making a ration-
al assessment of alternative courses of
action. 119
1 . Robert McNamara 's Operational Code
McNamara' s worldview between 1965 and 1968 as re-
flected in his speeches and in his book The Essence of
Security was based on the principles of internationalism,
the futility of nuclear war, and cost-effectiveness.
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His internationalism stemmed from a belief in the exist-
ence of multiple centers of world power and a break-down
of the communist world movement. His goal for the foreign
policy of the United States was
the hope of helping to create, in keeping
with the principles of the United Nations
Charter, a world in which even the small-
est state could look forward to an inde-
pendent existence, free to develop in
its own way... free from fear of armed
attack of political domination by the
more powerful nations. 1^0
McNamara also believed that it was impossible to be an iso-
lationist in a world of nuclear weapons, economic interde-
pendence, and the "gap between communist promise and
f* ..121communist reality."
McNamara T s view of nuclear war, expressed in numerous
public statements, was that no reasonable nation could hope
to achieve victory in such a war. Once the nuclear powers
had the means of mutual destruction the question of super-
iority became less significant. In his analysis of the
McNamara years, Henry Trewitt concludes that,
McNamara had come to believe that nuclear
superiority was a meaningless advantage
once competiting powers had the forces
of mutual destruction. The attempt to
preserve it, he felt, could only continue
an endless and meaningless arms race. ^
McNamara' s belief system regarding nuclear war and deter-
rence has already been presented in this thesis. In summary,
his writings in Essence of Security and elsewhere indicate
that to him nuclear deterrence achieved by an assured
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destruction capability, was the cornerstone of American stra-
tegic theory. However, McNamara also felt that a part of
that theory should also be a move towards disarmament as a
continued build-up of arms was not only foolish but, in fact,
counter-productive. McNamara' s beliefs regarding nuclear
war were best summarized when he wrote,
However foolish unlimited war may have
been in the past, it is now no longer
merely foolish, but suicidal as well.
In the end, the roof of man's security
does not lie in his weaponry, it lies
in his mind. What the world requires
... is not a new race toward armament,
but a new race toward reasonableness. ^
In addition to his beliefs about "reasonableness,"
McNamara also maintained several beliefs on how a major or-
ganization should function to be effective. His belief
system also included the concept of "cost-effectiveness."
124
Both Henry Trewitt and David Halberstam provide numerous
anecdotes of McNamara as a man who attempted to control the
defense bureaucracy through concepts of cost-effectiveness
and planned budgeting to force "the reasoning of the
services on basic issues into the open for analysis and
debate." 125
McNamara' s belief system profoundly affected his approach
to strategic doctrine. His concept of assured destruction,
based on the basic "rationality" of the actors and mutual
desires for avoidance of nuclear war, became the measure by
which American strategic forces were procured. Using
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mathematical models a "cost-effective" strategic force was
developed to ensure the destruction of two-fifths of the
Soviet population and three-quarters of their industrial
capacity even if United States forces absorbed a surprise
first strike from the Soviet Union. These forces were
developed, at McNamara's direction, with an eye towards
enhancing the assured destruction capability. Systems
which met this criterion, such as MIRV, were selected,
those which did not, such as the B-70 bomber, were rejected
on deferred. Thus, as Enthoven and Smith recount, there
was also a movement towards reduction of vulnerability
which brought about reliance on minuteman and Polaris and
127
a reduction in the American bomber force. Finally,
McNamara's beliefs regarding nuclear war and cost-effect-
iveness led him to reject defensive systems which provided
less than 100% effectiveness capabilities. The case of
ABM is an excellent example of this. McMamara felt that
"any such system can obviously be defeated by an enemy's
simply sending more offensive warheads... the Soviets
would clearly be... motivated to increase their offensive
12 8
capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage."
Thus, McNamara's views on the futility of nuclear war,
the reasonableness of man, and cost-effectiveness, in part,
contributed to the strategic doctrine developed during his
tenure as Secretary of Defense. As noted earlier, the
concept of "assured destruction" has formed the theoretical
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base for strategic doctrine since 1965, and McNamara's con-
cept of the strategic TRIAD remains intact, more or less,
to this day. McNamara's operational code was reflected in
his systems choices and in his approach to doctrine, both
correlated with threat perceptions of the day - an emerging
detente.
2 . Henry Kissinger's Operational Code
Of the four personalities analyzed in this chapter,
Henry Kissinger is the one whose worldview is most easily
identified. His vast collection of academic writings and
official statements since the early 1950s reveal a continuity
of themes which runs through his latest work, The White
129House Years . Tn his analysis of Kissinger's "operational
code" Harvey Starr stated that this plethora of writing and
the remarkable continuity of beliefs expressed the therein
made Kissinger an excellent personality for the application
of the operational code model.
Kissinger's worldview is broken down by Starr into three
basic beliefs which run throughout Kissinger's works. First,
Kissinger's view of life is one "which pits the forces of
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chaos against the forces of order." In this turmoil two
types of nation-states develop, the "legitimate" states which
support the status quo and the "revolutionary" states which
seek to upset it. Because of the nature of security however,
if one state is to be absolutely secure, the other states in
the international system must be insecure. Additionally
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Kissinger also believes that if many nations seek peace
(i.e. "avoidance of war") that the world is at the mercy
of the most ruthless power.
Kissinger views leaders as falling into one of three
categories, the "conquerers," the "prophets," and the
"statesmen." It is from the latter group that mankind can
transcend perpetual chaos and the individual can have some
effect on his destiny. Kissinger felt that a statesman
can influence history by "grasping the proper historical
131
moment through acts of vision and courage." To do so,
he must be free from the constraints of domestic opinion
and the governmental bureaucracy. This premise somewhat
contradicts the "Spenglerian" image of Kissinger put forward
132by former Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt, and
others. However, it appears that Kissinger felt that an
individual statesman could, in fact, affect history.
Finally, there are Kissinger's views on nuclear war.
In his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy , Kissinger
clearly and emphatically rejected the doctrine of "massive
retaliation," stating:
A reliance on all-out war as the Chief
deterrent will sap our system of alli-
ances in two ways: either our allies will
feel that any military effort on their
part is unnecessary, or they may be led
to the conviction that peace is prefer-
able to war even on terms almost akin
to surrender . 133
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Kissinger felt the need for a doctrine which defined the pur-
pose of nuclear weapons and their potential uses to allow
134
some level of rational choice. In 1957 he wrote
The basic requirement for American Security
is a doctrine which will enable us to act
purposefully in the face of challenges
which will inevitably confront us... since
our policy is so explicitly based on deter-
rence, our doctrine must pay particular at-
tention to determining how the other side
j
calculates its risks. Deterrence is
achieved when the opponent cannot calcu-
late any gain from the action we seek to
prevent . 135
Those positions remained essentially unchanged in 1979 when
Kissinger wrote The White House Years although he was not
satisfied that "assured destruction" was a realistic
doctrine. In his words,
for the first time a major country saw
an advantage in enhancing its own vul-
nerability. 'Assured destruction' was
one of those theories that sound im-
pressive in an academic seminar but
are horribly unworkable for a decision-
maker in the real world... I'd
Kissinger set about to operationalize his world views on
strategic doctrine primarily in his relations with the Soviet
Union through the process of detente. According to Harvey
Starr,
these policies included the idea of em-
bedding the Soviet Union within a grow-
ing web of economic, technological, and
political interdependencies so that it
would have an increasing stake in the
stability and survival of the interna-
tional order. This process was meant






In short, Kissinger set about to be the "statesman," seizing
the opportunity of history to affect destiny. Kissinger
used negotiations to attempt to achieve this goal of "re-
socializing" the Soviet Union, to persuade them to "set
aside ambitions to make advances elsewhere in the world at
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the expense of the West." Through negotiation he appears
to have been attempting to set limits on the behavior of
both sides and to bring the Soviet Union to accept his basic
premise that in order for all states to have some degree
security, absolute security must be sacrificed.
In The White House Years Kissinger recounts his success
in modifying the strategic doctrine of assured destruction
through the concept of "strategic sufficiency," to base stra-
139tegic doctrine on a "rationale, rather than by reflex."
Although the actual modification of plans and strategy by
140
this declaratory change is open to question, this attempt
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to modify doctrine to conform to his world views is apparent.
Thus Kissinger's world view, or belief system, was
operationalized through his attempt to resocialize the Soviet
Union and to change the criteria of "assured destruction."
However, Kissinger's affect on strategic doctrine was in-
direct in that force levels were affected by the limitations
resultant from his negotiations with the Soviet Union, and
not from his direct involvement with the system.
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3. James Schlesinger ' s Operational Code
While not as well-known as either McNamara or Kissinger,
it is safe to say that James Schlesinger had a dramatic effect
on American strategic doctrine through his appeals for selec-
tive targeting options and increased conventional procurement
found in the FY 1975 Defense Budget. Also, like the two per-
sonalities previously examined, Schlesinger ' s belief system
profoundly affected his approach to policy.
One of the best expressions of Schlesinger ' s beliefs
142
is found in his 1976 article "A Testing Time for America."
Referring to the United States as the "only political
counter-weight to the military and political power of the
Soviet Union," Schlesinger stated his beliefs regarding
power.
Power remains the ultimate sanction in
dealing with potential conflict. Where
power exists and is respected it will
not have to be exercised. Through
power one can deter the initiation of
an unfavorable chain of events. To be
sure, military power is not the only
kind of power, but it remains an irre-




Schlesinger' s beliefs, stemming from these above,
were that the United States had a duty to participate in
the international system not only because of its inheritance
of the "post-World War II mantle of world leadership," but
also because "at no point since the 1930s [had] the Western
145
world faced so formidable a threat to its survival."
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Schlesinger felt that because of an underestimation of the
Soviet defense effort that a major re-examination was required
of the adequacy of American strategic policy. Schlesinger
found several theoretical flaws in American doctrine, be-
lieving that M.A.D. not only lacked credibility, but also
posed potential "Strangelove" scenarios of accidental nuclear
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war. Schlesinger also believed, in 1973, that achievement
of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union had altered the stra-
tegic balance on which M.A.D. was based.
Schlesinger also recognized domestic limitations to the
amount of military power that the public would be willing to
support as well as the apparent contradictions between power
and idealism. Addressing each of these issues, he wrote:
In a democracy such as the United States,
foreign policy will reflect domestic
politics. Our internal preoccupations
and our political divisions of recent
years have at least suggested a growing
infirmity of American policy.
. . . there is no incompatibility between
a strong military posture and idealism
. . . only through the security afforded
by adequate military strength can we
assure reasonably free play to our own
aspirations . "°
According to Kinnard, when Schlesinger entered office he
brought with him two goals, first, to undo the Vietnam legacy
and secondly to revise U.S. strategic policy. In the FY 1975
Budget, Schlesinger set about to improve conventional force
levels, increase funds for research and development, and in
short, increase spending in the areas of defense "investment
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capital." Schlesinger also set about to alter America's
declaratory strategic posture through articulation of his
"counter-force" targeting options. Schlesinger T s lack of
faith in M.A.D. and the mathematical and cost-effective
models which "spawned" it was demonstrated by his support
for the B-l bomber through which he intended to off-set the
Soviet missile advantage resulting from SALT I as well as
complicating Soviet resource allocation for defense systems.
Schlesinger f s distain for cost-effectiveness in systems
procurement is clearly shown in an October 1974 Miami
Herald article in which he stated,
America's strategic nuclear forces were
bought not for their specific cost-effec-
tive contribution to target destruction,
but for their broad contribution to that ,,g
panoply of power that maintains deterrence.
Finally, Schlesinger was skeptical of detente because of
his basic belief system, believing that the Soviets were
using the process to gain dominance over the West and would
not become entangled by the Western system.
Schlesinger ' s tenure as Secretary of Defense is another
clear example of how an individual's belief system can
affect his policy choices and how an individual's actions
can impact on strategic doctrine. The declaratory shift
to counter- force targeting remains intact today through
PD-59. Additionally, the strategic and conventional force
structures and programs initiated by Schlesinger ' s Defense
Department directly impacted on the strategic options
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available to the Carter Administration as well as providing a
"yardstick" by which that Administration's success, or failure,
can be determined.
4. Jimmy Carter's Operational Code
Shifts in views during his Administration complicate
the task of determining Jimmy Carter's belief system. Limited
writings and lack of continuity in his public statements make
it difficult to apply the operational code approach to him.
However, from various sources a generalized picture of Carter's
world views emerges. First, most of the authors surveyed in-
dicate that Carter is a man of high moral principles who set
about, in Alexander George's words, to "embue U.S. foreign
policy with a renewed moral purpose." Secondly, that
prior to entering office and for at least the first two
years of his Presidency, Carter believed that it was neces-
sary to reduce significantly the nuclear arsenals of both
the super-powers. Third, as a former engineer, Carter
was possessed of a technician's mindset having "confidence
in the possibility of mastering difficult problems and of
152finding 'comprehensive' 'solutions' for them." Finally,
Carter's belief in the basic rationality of mankind (as
articulated in his 1978 Naval Academy speech, previously
quoted) combined with his former submarine officer back-
ground to produce a view of nuclear war which he presented
in an Aviation Week article prior to his election in 1976.
In that article Carter is quoted as saying,
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There would be no possibility under the
sun that a first-strike capability could
be adequate in preventing massive destruc-
tion of the country that originated the
strike. .. There is no way to prevent a
massive retaliatory strike because for
all practical purposes atomic submarines
are invulnerable. 153
This world view was clearly translated into policies in
the early days of the Carter Administration. Carter's
attempts to give American foreign policy a new moral dimen-
sion are apparent in his initial support for "human rights."
Secondly, his belief that the world has too many nuclear
weapons was operationalized in his unilateral actions with
respect to American strategic programs (such as closing the
Minuteman production line and canceling the B-l bomber pro-
gram) and his request in 1976 for a "feasibility study" to
evaluate the effects of reducing the American deterrent
154force to between 200 and 250 delivery vehicles. This
belief that there was a world-wide need to reduce nuclear
weapons combined with his belief that the Soviet Union
shared the same interests as the United States regarding
prevention of nuclear war was manifested in the so-called
SALT "comprehensive proposal" of March 1977. Finally,
Carter's technician's mindset effected the way in which
he approached problems. According to his former speech
writer, James Fallows, Carter tended to "view... problems
as technical, not historical..." and became preoccupied
with their details. Because of this he failed to "project
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a vision larger than the problem he [was] tackling at the
157
moment..." - an approach that promoted confusion on the
part of his subordinates and a muddled policy.
Thus, Carter's restricted world view and fundamental
belief system produced an affect on American strategic
doctrine by stagnating and confusing it. Unilateral actions
with respect to strategic programs restricted their develop-
ment while lack of guidance from the Chief Executive confused
governmental spokesmen, allies, adversaries, and the American
public. The FY 1980 Defense Budget is a product of this lack
of guidance with its support for SALT, multiple targeting
options, and "launch-on-warning ." Like his predecessors,
Jimmy Carter affected American strategic doctrine but through
lack of direction rather than by direct modification.
F. THE EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
An analysis of the determinants of strategic nuclear doc-
trine between 1965-1980 would be incomplete without an evalu-
ation of the role which the Vietnam War played on policy.
Surprisingly, this is one area which has been ignored by
most analysts. Therefore it is difficult to determine the
direct effects that the war might have had. By drawing
inferences from several sources it appears that the Vietnam
War affected funding for defense programs, directly impacting
on Research and Development; produced a permanent "anti-
defense lobby" in Congress; and brought about a shift of
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attention from central strategic systems, such as ICBMs, to
matters directly associated with effectively prosecuting the
war.
The figures below indicate funding, in constant dollars,
for strategic forces and for research and development during
the fiscal years which encompassed the Vietnam War:
(Figures in Billions of Dollars)
FISCAL YEAR TOTAL BUDGET* STRATEGIC FORCES RU
1964 50.6 8.5 4.8
1968 75.5 7.2 4.2
1973 80.4 7.2 6.4
1974 87.1 6.8 7.0
*Budget Authority
Source: Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year
1975, Table 1, p. 235, year for constant dollars
not indicated.
The above figures indicate that in spite of a rising
defense budget from 1964 to 1974, spending in the area of
strategic forces declined while research and development
expenditures remained roughly constant until the end of direct
U.S. participation in the war in 1973. Part of the reduction
of strategic force spending is due to the fact that most of
the systems procured during the force modernization and expan-
sion of the early Kennedy years had come on line recently
and were not in need of upgrading or replacement. The area
of research and development is another matter, however. A
review of the FY 1969 Defense Budget, chosen because of its
presentation at the height of the war, reveals several pieces
of evidence which indicate a shift of R § D efforts from
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strategic systems to respond to the situation in Southeast
Asia. In the twelve pages devoted to R 5 D in the FY 69
Budget only a single program, POSEIDON, is a completely stra-
tegic program. The other programs have either multi-mission
applications (AWACS and Electronic Warfare equipment, for
example) or, like VSTOL aircraft and "heavy-lift" helicopters,
are purely general purpose systems. Additionally, in his
i
prepared statement, Dr. John Foster, Head of DDR § E, cites
the efforts of PROVOST, an R U program developed to
"...respond quickly to new technical problems arising from
158
combat operations in Southeast Asia." Foster went on to
cite that during FY 1968 the PROVOST program met its goal of
operationally testing over twenty items per quarter and that
DOD was fully satisfied with the program. The direct impact
of this redirection of effort was the potential slowing of
technological development in areas other than those underway
prior to 1965 (such as ABM and MIRV) as priorities shifted
to general purpose research such as those covered by PROVOST.
At the same time strategic budgets were shrinking, anti-
defense "lobbies" were growing. As Edward Laurance concludes,
the "general climate of support for executive defense policies
in 1947-1967 disintegrated by 1968 and remained that way
159through 1975." Laurance supports his conclusions through
a content analysis of witnesses before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee. Prior to 1969, the committee interviewed
zero non-DOD witnesses, and heard no witnesses advocating
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cuts in defense spending. In 1969, this pattern was radic-
ally altered as 32 non-DOD witnesses gave testimony, and 21
of these witnesses recommended cuts in defense spending. In
1971, five of the six non-DOD witnesses offered testimony in
support of cuts in defense spending. However, this
shift to non-DOD sources of information was only part of the
change in congressional attitude. The atmosphere regarding
defense matters is best described in Henry Kissinger's
account of the debate on the FY 1971 Defense Budget:
by... December 1970, Congress had made
its mind to cut an additional $2.1
billion even though Nixon had already
reduced it by $5 billion. . . but even
this does not measure the pervasive
anti-military atmosphere, the hostil-
ity to defense spending, the proba-
bility that any new military programs
would lead to bitter fights...
... at a time when the Soviet build up
required urgent reexamination of stra-
tegic doctrine and of forces, the ener-
gies of the Executive were consummed
by a rearguard action to preserve a
minimal arsenal. Pentagon planners
were forced to concentrate on preserv-
ing the existing force structure rather -,,-.,
than adapting it to changed circumstances.
What the Vietnam War had done was to draw the attention of
the Congress to the matter of defense policy, "in the form
of ' end-the-war' amendments and the rise of opposition groups
whose anti-defense flavor went far beyond Vietnam-related
issues." In sum, Congress was now conditioned, at least
until 1975, to question and debate military matters rather
than defer to the recommendations of the Defense Department
and the Executive on military matters.
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Finally there are generalizations of the War's effects
which cannot be conclusively proven, yet still should be




The decision taken by the United States
in July 1965 to escalate the war in
Vietnam. . . was to have substantial in-
fluence on Congress's, the Executive's,
and Secretary of Defense McNamara's
attitudes and options regarding the
selection, funding, and deployment of
advanced strategic nuclear offensive
forces during the years from 1965-1969.
The deeper the nation's immersion in
Vietnam, the more McNamara consumed his
prodigious energies in the details of the
conflict. ,. 164
Moulton speculates that preoccupation with the struggle in
Vietnam led McNamara to conclude that the United States had
purchased more strategic systems than needed for "assured
destruction," a conclusion McNamara articulated in both the
FY 1969 Budget and in Essence of Security . Moulton also
speculates that McNamara's attentions were shifted from
central systems and that his rejection or deferral of deci-
sions on such systems as ABM, Minuteman III, the B-70, etc.
are evidence of this attitudinal shift. Other authors spe-
culate that the shift in funding during the war years from
"capital investment" activities such as overhauls to opera-
tional needs and Vietnam-related developments led to a reluc
tance on the part of services, such as the Navy, to commit
themselves to greater strategic expansion in the face of
deteriorating general purpose forces.
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The major direct effects of the Vietnam War with respect
to strategic doctrine appear to be fiscal and attitudinal,
affecting the funding and development of future strategic
systems and the doctrine necessary to employ them. The
Vietnam War led to a questioning of the priorities of defense
spending while establishing conditions, as described by
Moulton and Kissinger, which redirected the attention of
those responsible for establishing and implementing doctrine
to the day-to-day conduct of the war and attempting to retain
the "forces-in-being" from anti-defense pressure in Congress.
G. A SUMMARY OF THE DETERMINANTS
The domestic determinants, examined above, each had a
direct effect on strategic doctrine between 1965-1980. How-
ever, the direct effects of the individual determinants are
but one facet of their ability to affect doctrinal change.
The interrelationship between these variables can also sig-
nificantly impact on strategic doctrine. This area will be
examined in the next chapter.
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IV. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS
In the previous chapter, the direct impact of the five
domestic variables on strategic doctrine was examined with-
out discussion of the impact of variable inter-relationships.
The hypotehsis postulated in chapter one, however, speculated
that complex inter-relationships between the variables might
complicate doctrinal formulation for the "grand strategist."
To determine the effects of the inter-relationships this
chapter will first identify the inter-relationships uncovered
by the previous analysis. The potential effects of these
inter-relationships of future doctrinal formulation are then
assessed.
A. THREAT PERCEPTIONS
As noted earlier, the concept of threat perception not
only directly interfaces with the external environment but
also has a direct inter-relationship with the personality
and public opinion variables. As has been demonstrated, the
national leadership articulates its perception of the
external threat in terms of both external indicators and
domestic public opinion boundaries. Indicators evaluated by
Charles Marcy and George Gallup, previously cited, indicate
the perceptions of the American public regarding the threat
posed by the Soviet Union shifted during the period surveyed
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and roughly corresponded with an increasingly optimistic and
then pessimistic articulation of the perceived threat pre-
sented by the political leadership. A similar trend is shown
below regarding a shift in attitudes regarding the possibility
of nuclear attack against specific American cities:
Question (1961) : "If we should have an
all out nuclear war, do you think this
locality would be one the Russians would
particularly want to bomb, or not?"
Question (1976) : "Do you think your city









The attitudes reflected in the polls above indicate, again,
that perception of the threat by the general populace de-
creased as the rhetoric of the political leadership became
less strident.
An additional linkage can be drawn between a shift in
threat perception and the Vietnam War. Arguing that the
war brought about a shift away from the generally accepted
paradigm of "containment," Michael Nacht writes:
It is now commonly agreed that the Vietnam
War was a disaster , for the South Vietna-
mese people and for the United States, and
should not be repeated. What has prompted
this dramatic shift ... to the equation of










in American foreign policy? Clearly, in
the early 1960s Americans held certain
views and retained certain images about
international politics and about them-
selves that they no longer accept. The
agony of the Vietnam experience produced
this change. 1^7
The Vietnam War and threat perception inter-reacted with one
another in an additional way not considered by Nacht . As the
leadership's articulated position with respect to the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China became less strident
and move optimistic, and as events such as SALT I and
President Nixon's visit to Peking occurred, the public began
to question the validity of a war to "stop the spread of
communism" in Vietnam. This incongruity between policies
and perceptions led the public to conclude, as Laurance
states, "that a victory in Vietnam was [not] essential to the
l ft ft
security of the United States." Additionally, reduced per-
ception of an external threat, occasioned in part by optimis-
tic rhetoric vis -a-vis the Soviet Union, the process of detente,
and the high expense of the Vietnam War, may have also con-
tributed to an unwillingness on the part of the American
people to fund high-cost strategic programs and their research
and development.
B. TECHNOLOGY
The analysis of this thesis leads this author to the con-
clusion that although technological development may have,
in fact, been influenced by the other variables, such as the
85

style or beliefs of a given Secretary of Defense or President,
it has little impact other than its direct impact in shaping
the available force structure. In some cases this variable
may have no inter-relationship, as was the case with the
personality of Henry Kissinger. Although Kissinger acknowl-
edged the basic effect of the nuclear revolution on strategy,
his opinions regarding technology's impact in spawning more
warheads through MIRV and similar systems was summed up by
his July 1974 statement following the final Nixon-Brezhnev
summit in which he exclaimed:
One of the questions which we have to
ask ourselves as a country is what in
the name of God is strategic super-
iority? What is the significance of
it, politically, militarily, opera-
's'?
yoi
ionally, at these levels, of number;
What do u do with it? lby
In short, Kissinger appears to have believed that short of
a technological break-through of the magnitude of nuclear
weapons, statesmanship would outweigh technological advances
in the determination of strategic doctrine.
C. PUBLIC OPINION
The direct and indirect effects of this variable on
doctrine have already been discussed with respect to threat
perception. However, the inter-relationship of this variable
with other the domestic factors can also significantly affect
the formulation and implementation of strategic doctrine.
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Huntington's conclusion that what the public thinks on speci-
fic issues is not as important as what the political leader-
ship perceives they think has already been discussed. The
conclusion drawn from this analysis is that public opinion
sets the boundaries with respect to the options available to
the political leadership.
Public opinion obviously set the boundaries with respect
to the Vietnam War because of the inter-relationship of
these two factors. As troop commitments and additional
casualty figures increased, public belief that the war was
170
not a mistake decreased as indicated below.
IN COUNTRY THE WAR AS A
YEAR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FORCE LEVEL* MISTAKE
1965 Danang Landing (March) 184,300 "No": 611
Increased Draft Call
Up (July)
1968 "TET" (January) 549,500 "No": 421 (Feb)
Bombing Halt (October) 37% (Oct)
*As of 31 December
While the "no" responses above did not indicate a shift to
direct opposition to the war, they did indicate dwindling
popular support for official policy. Likewise, as Laurance
proposes, an indirect reaction of the public to the Vietnam
War was reflected in the development of an anti-defense
"bloc" within the Congress. He states:
The election and reelection of legisla-
tors critical of defense programs, with
the support of the public... created a
congressional bloc which provide [d] a
continuous source of non-DOD policy
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alternatives. Their presence as a le-
gitimate bloc add[ed] to the public's
lack of fear of external threat . -^1
Thus, in this instance, the public opinion variable inter
related with the Vietnam War and perception of the external
threat resulted in the development of a congressional bloc
whose voting patterns reduced funding of defense-related
projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Public approval/disapproval of specific weapons systems
can also have potential impact on the development or deploy-
ment of new systems, as positive on negative public reaction
is perceived by decision-makers and legislators. Public
fascination with a new system, such as particle beam weapons,
coupled with a fear of Soviet advantages unless the latest
technology is exploited, can combine to create a degree of
public support necessary to ensure project funding. At the
other end of the spectrum, public outrage such as that in
Utah and Nevada in response to the proposed MX deployment
can cause public leaders to delay, review, or cancel the
172
offending project.
Thus, public opinion has a wide-ranging effect on the
other four variables inter-relating with them to indirectly
impact on strategic doctrine.
D. PERSONALITIES
The influence of personalities on the variables of
public opinion and threat perception has already been noted.
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Therefore, this section will address the effect of person-
alities on weapons technology and the Vietnam War. Addition-
ally an example shall be presented of how personalities in
conflict can impact on doctrine.
Examples of individuals and their decisions on tech-
nology are many. Greenwood, for example, states:
[Tjhere can be little doubt that McNamara's
own policy preferences had major impact
on the MIRV programs. It was his concern
that Soviet ballistic missile defense
might jeopardize the American deterrent
that led to authorizing engineering devel-
opment of MIRV in the FY 1966 budget. It
was his desire to improve counter- force
capability that led to the accuracy im-
provement program for Poseidon. It was
his opposition to an expanded Minuteman
force, new manned bombers, and ballistic
missile defense systems that made MIRV
a politically advantageous system... the
decisions that were executed were McNamara's
and their purpose was to further the goals
that he thought at the time were worth
pursuing.-'- '*
Likewise, Carter's rejection of the B-l bomber and his ter-
mination of ICBM production provide other examples of the
inter-relationship between an individual's belief systems
and technology with an ultimate impact on strategy. However,
the ability of an individual to redirect technology is gen-
erally limited. Although McNamara rejected the manned
bomber (B-70) in the mid-1960s, his authorization of con-
tinued R 5 D ultimately resulted in the B-l. Carter's
rejection of the B-l also did not terminate manned bomber
research. Additionally by shifting emphasis from the B-l
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to cruise missiles, by his decision, Carter may have (iron-
ically) stimulated weapons R § D more than he hindered it
and in a direction inimical to his own arms control goals.
Thus while an individual appears able to channel development
efforts, he generally cannot stifle them, and in some cases
decisions regarding a program by one individual can be
reversed by his successor.
One inter-relationship not previously addressed in this
thesis is that regarding the inter-relationship of multiple
personalities with one of the other variables. An excellent
example of this is found in the circumstances regarding the
Kissinger-Schlesinger confrontation over threat perception
and appropriate response which occurred in 1974 and 1975
and which led to Schlesinger ' s removal from his position as
Secretary of Defense. As indicated earlier in this thesis,
both men had precise ideas regarding the nature of interna-
tional relations and the role of power in those relations.
Although the two men agreed on a number of substantive
positions, and were not as diametrically opposed as some
might suggest, they disagreed regarding the speed with which
the SALT negotiations should proceed, the value of SALT to
the Soviets, and the degree of firmness that the American
negotiating posture should assume. While Kissinger, on the
one hand, was willing to offer the Soviets a number of econ-
omic incentives and risk an unfavorable SALT agreement to
further the process of detente, Schlesinger proposed a
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"hard-line" with respect to the Soviets to "persuade them that
their best interest lay in a reasonable agreement with the
174United States." Basically, these two individuals con-
flicted because of their basic belief systems and their
perceptions of the world system. The result was hardening
of positions between the two and the articulation of two
separate "doctrines," one of detente from Kissinger and
another of "counter-force" from Schlesinger. Schlesinger 's
ouster as Secretary of Defense as a partial result of his
personality clashes with Kissinger and Ford, may also have
impacted on long-term support for conventional and strategic
force build-ups by focusing public attention on the Ford
Administration's internal debate regarding strategic doctrine
While the public may not have fully understood the ramifica-
tions of the Schlesinger firing in context with the fall of
Vietnam and Kissinger's pressures to intervene in Angola,
the public was made aware, through the media, of the separate
positions of the principal actors. The Schlesinger firing
and similar factors gave support to the "hard-line" challenge
of Ronald Reagan in the 1976 primary campaign. This conser-
vative pressure resulted in higher defense appropriations by
the Ford Administration in response to criticism that detente
was weakening the country. The roots of the present public




E. VIETNAM'S MULTIPLE EFFECTS
Some of the indirect effects of the Vietnam War on
doctrine through the war's impact on public opinion, military
spending levels, and research and development have already-
been noted in this thesis. Likewise, Kissinger's memoirs,
previously cited, indicate how the defense establishment
became preoccupied with the conduct of the war and with
preparing arguments against reduction of defense funds to the
neglect of strategic doctrine development for the long-term.
The last chapter dealt also with the redirection of R § D
funding to operational uses or to research supporting con-
ventional instead of strategic development programs and on
strategic weapons research. The effects of Vietnam on public
opinion and perceptions of the external threat have also been
addressed herein.
Some additional ramifications for strategic doctrine
remain. First, the potential long-term effects of the war
on the perceptions of future American leaders appear to be
substantial. Holsti and Rosenau, in their survey of the
Vietnam War's effects on belief systems and consensus, con-
clude that Vietnam's after-effects could "shape the world-
views of American leaders in the same way Pearl Harbor
175did..." an earlier generation. Their research reveals
that the war had a significant effect on the belief systems
1 7 f\
of future leaders yielding, among other things, a general
consensus against unilateral action, although a consensus
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also exists that if force should be required, it should be
applied quickly and should maximize political rather than
military goals. However, Holsti and Rosenau conclude that:
the findings appear to reflect at least
a mood of caution and skepticism about
the use of force to cope with future
conflicts . *''
Another long-term effect of the Vietnam War regarding further
public opinion constraints on the political leadership in its
ability to implement strategic doctrine has been suggested
by Lunch and Sperlich:
a number of changes have already occurred
in the aftermath of the war. Greater
skepticism regarding government claims,
more resistance regarding government
plans, and considerable popular aliena-
tion from the symbols of the American
political system by the American people
have followed the end of American in-
volvement in Vietnam. Attitudes and
predispositions such as these make poli-
tical leadership difficult, particulary
if skeptical constituents impose con-
straints on the executive. *-'°
Thus, the conclusion can be drawn from the above that the
Vietnam War inter-reacted with all of the other variables
addressed in the above thesis to not only effect the stra-
tegic doctrine of the war period but to effect a degree of
attitudinal change on the part of the American public and
the political leadership that produced, in Michael Nacht's
words, M [a] transfer of allegiances away from containment...
without moving toward any alternative... during the years
since the fall of Vietnam, we have witnessed an unsuccessful
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search for a new set of guidelines to given American foreign
179policy." It appears that the most significant result of
the war and its inter-relationship with the other domestic
variables has been a questioning of the basic foundation
of "containment," on which post-World War II American stra-




In the preceding four chapters five domestic determinants
of American strategic nuclear doctrine have been examined for
direct and indirect impact on that doctrine. In this examin-
ation the following conclusions were drawn.
First, each of the domestic determinants has some direct
impact on the formulation of America's national strategic
doctrine, while all but technology have an indirect impact
through inter-relationships with the other determinants. An
external threat, filtered through domestic perceptions,
impacts on strategic doctrine when the external and internal
environments are prioritiezed by the national leadership.
In a means as indicated by figure 2 these perceptions are
analyzed and articulated to the public. The public, however,
also perceives the external threat in a way which may or may
not coincide with the perceptions of the national leadership.
Through the process of priority establishment this disparity
is generally resolved to produce a strategic doctrine. Public
opinion, through its impact on public officials, sets the
boundaries for strategic doctrine by indicating willingness
to support, fund, or generally permit the employment of
assets or the deployment of forces. Technology, in turn,
cultivated by a semi- autonomous research community, directed





































Figure 2. The Filtering Process
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The belief systems of the leadership affect their perception
of the threat and shape their responses to it. These per-
sonalities may however be limited by the impact of other
belief systems on their own or by the effects of public
opinion or bureaucratic actors. Finally, the Vietnam War
may in fact have been the seminal event of the last quarter
century with regard to direct and indirect impact on strategic
doctrine. The war:
(1) Affected public consensus regarding
the leadership's wisdom and regarding
levels of adequacy for defense
spending.
(2) Resulted in a limitation of research
and development activity for new
strategic programs between 1967-1973.
(3) Limited the ability of the national
leadership to unilaterally revise
strategic doctrine or system pro-
curement by increasing the scrutiny
of defense programs and requiring
a greater degree of justification
of those programs.
Finally, the war brought about a "restructuring" of the
basic containment paradigm and a reluctance on the part of
the public and the upcoming leadership to employ force in
instances which previously may have been considered in the
national interest.
As mentioned earlier, this has not been an exhaustive
evaluation of the domestic issues with potential impact on
strategic doctrine, therefore there are areas left for
further research and study. A more detailed analysis is
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called for regarding the role of the bureaucracies on the
five domestic determinants. Additionally, it would be
worthwhile to investigate the trends of threat perception
since the Second World War to determine to what degree the
leaders articulate the threat to the public and to what
degree they reflect the public's opinion. Finally, the role
of the Vietnam War deserves a more thorough evaluation. For
example, the war's role in establishing the conditions which
resulted in Schlesinger ' s articulation of "counter-force
options" in 1974 requires further scrutiny.
The conclusions above have an impact on the ability of
future policy makers to affect strategic doctrines through
policy choices. In a recent Washington Post article,
"Defense with a Capital 'D' ," Senator Sam Nunn called for
the development of a "broad [bi-partisan] consensus on
national security strategy to cope with the threats of the
180decade ahead." Senator Nunn called for the implementation
of measures within the defense community, such as higher pay,
reevaluation of force levels, and a revision of defense
priorities, to solve the problems of strategic relations
with the Soviet Union. While the Senator's recommendations
are valid and a positive step towards solution of the present
conditions, the evidence presented in this thesis indicates
that much more must be done to turn things around than just
"replacing the... one-year budget process," or taking a
181
"fresh look at our use of technology." As has been noted,
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the public still retains the Vietnam legacy of reluctance to
employ force, especially in conditions where the threat is
vague. What is needed, therefore, in addition to Senator
Nunn's recommendations, is a national consensus regarding the
exact nature of the threat. There is a need for public en-
lightenment (a function of the political leadership) as well
as a realization that there are domestic limitations regard-
ing what the public is willing to accept as a valid threat.
By way of conclusion it is a appropriate to return to
the basic hypothesis. The evidence above indicates that the
hypothesis is supported by the impact of the five domestic
variables on strategic doctrine. Additionally, there is
support for the hypothesis that a complex inter-relationship
exists between these variables to complicate the task of the
"grand strategist." However, a grand strategy is feasible
if it is truly "grand," by taking into account these domestic
limitations and by allowing sufficient time to reasonably
educate the public in the nature of the threat and to develop
a domestic consensus regarding how to meet that threat. The
"grand strategist," (the personality variable) must set about
to define the perceived threat within the allowable boundaries
of public opinion. The threat must then be clearly articu-
lated to the public so that, to a degree, the public and
the leadership concur regarding its nature. Technology must
be directed so that, without stifling the healthy aspects of
intra-national competition or preparedness for the "unexpected,"
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technical developments may produce weapon systems which coincide
with national strategy rather than requiring justification by
it. Finally, the strategic doctrine should be presented to
the public in a way that will allow public enlightenment and
consensus formulation. A frank, open, and honest debate of
national priorities and requirements will go far to erasing
one of the major domestic legacies of Vietnam, skepticism
regarding governmental motives and actions.
Thus by mobilizing the first four domestic variables,
the "grand strategist" (i.e. the "fifth variable") may also
be able to mobilize the nation behind a national strategic
doctrine. It should be noted that action, such as recommended
above would be a challenging task. The formation of consensus
regarding foreign policy goals has occurred only rarely in
American history*, such as during the Second World War and in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, failure to build
such a consensus should not be taken as a sign of "weakness"
or "decline" but rather as a reaffirmation of the pluralistic
nature of the domestic American society, a fact amply demon-
strated by the information presented in this thesis. The
sign of "decline" would be in the failure to attempt to
mold a national consensus for a strategic doctrine, and
instead allow these pluralistic domestic forces to produce
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